

Burundi

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Burundi is coded as a non-democracy from independence in 1962 until 1993. According to Geddes, Burundi is a monarchy until 1966. There is no SOLS change at independence. Mwambutsa IV Bangiriceng (Tutsi, Bezi clan) ruled as king during this period. (The names of the Burundian kings followed a fixed cycle: Ntare, Mwezi, Mutaga, and Mwambutsa. “Historically, the kings of Burundi took up in turn one of four dynastic names... The descendants of a king... formed a clan carrying the dynastic name of the progenitor” (Crowder 1985, 715). These royal clans competed with each other for power. Mwambutsa was deposed in July 1966 by his son, Prince Charles Ndizeye (Tutsi, Bezi), who took the name Ntare V. This is not a SOLS change since he was Mwambutsa’s pre-designated successor (Crowder 1985, 737; Cornwell and de Beer 1999). We have coded both Mwambutsa and Ntare SOLS as “Mwambutsa Dynasty”.

That same year Ntare was ousted by a military coup led by Michel Micombero of the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA), predominantly a Tutsi party. Micombero abolished the monarchy and established a military-single-party regime. This is a SOLS change. The country is coded as a single-party-military-hybrid authoritarian regime starting in 1966 lasting until 1987. In 1976, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, a Tutsi and member of UPRONA, led another military coup. This is not a SOLS change since Bagaza, like Micombero before him, had the support of the military and the UPRONA party. Bagaza ruled until 1987 when Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi and also a member of UPRONA, overthrew him in another military coup. The country goes from a single-party-military-hybrid authoritarian regime to a pure military regime. This is a minor SOLS change. Buyoya prepared the country for multiparty elections.

In 1993 Melchior Ndadaye (FRODEBU), the country’s first Hutu president, was elected. According to our coding rules, the country is not democratic at this time, although Cheibub et al. (2010) consider Burundi to be a presidential system from 1993 through 1995. We code a SOLS change in 1993 because Ndadaye was not affiliated with the military— Geddes codes the military regime as ending with his election— and unlike his predecessor he was a Hutu and thus received support from the Hutu population. The Hutu party to which he belonged was the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU). Later in the year he was assassinated by the military during a coup (Ndikumana 1998, 36) and François Ngeze, Mil, took power. This is a SOLS change. A week later, Sylvie Kinigi (Tutsi, UPRONA), who had been Ndadaye’s prime minister (and the first female prime minister in all of Africa) temporarily took over while talks were held to decide the future composition of Burundi’s government. Because Kinigi was an interim president (Cahoon 2010; Cornwell and de Beer 1999), this is not a SOLS change. The 1993 assassination aggravated the unrest between the minority ruling Tutsis and the majority opposition Hutus. Civil war ensued. Accordingly, from 1993 to 1996 Geddes has no information on regime type.

In 1994 another Hutu, Cyprien Ntaryamira (FRODEBU), was elected president. While Ntaryamira (FRODEBU) has a different SOLS from Ngeze (Mil), the last regular leader, he has the same SOLS as Ndadaye (FRODEBU). Since Ngeze was only in power about three weeks, this is an “ABA”-scenario as described in our coding rules but it extends over two years rather than just one. We code the resumption of power by the same SOLS after a less than 30-day

interruption as solschange30. Thus, in 1994 solschange30=1 but solschange=0. Later in 1994 Ntaryamira was killed in a plane crash with the president of Rwanda, the event which sparked the Rwandan genocide. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya (FRODEBU) replaced Ntaryamira as president. This is not a SOLS change because they belonged to the same party and were Hutus, dominant identity at the time. From 1993 to 1996 an estimated 150,000 people were killed in the conflict. Regional actors began to contemplate an intervention to stop the violence (Cornwell and de Beer 1999). To avoid this, Buyoya, the former president and a Tutsi (UPRONA), staged a coup and took power in 1996. This is a SOLS change since power was transferred from Hutus to Tutsis and from FRODEBU to UPRONA. Peace talks were held in 2000. The Arusha Accords dictated a transitional period of three years starting in 2001. Buyoya would hold the title of president for 18 months and Ndayizeye would act as vice-president for 18 months. Then they would switch roles for 18 months (Matthias 2006, 140). GWF list the military/personalist regime of Buyoya as continuing until 2003 (and then code provisional until 2005).

In 2003, Ndayizeye succeeded Buyoya as stipulated by the accords. Because of the power-sharing agreement, Ndayizeye can be seen as Buyoya's pre-designated successor. The transition from Buyoya to Ndayizeye is considered as a minor SOLS change. Although Ndayizeye can be considered as a Buyoya's pre-designated successor given their power-sharing/rotation deal, Ndayizeye's government had no military figures and Ndayizeye was from a different party. In addition, because he was in power for longer than the transitional period of 18 months, we do not consider him as provisional (although GWF treat him as provisional). Thus, we code a minor SOLS change for Ndayizeye. This temporary situation expired in late 2004 and the country became a presidential democracy in 2005 with the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu of the newly formed Conseil National pour la Défense des Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de Démocratie (CNDD-FDD). While Nkurunziza was a Hutu like Ndayizeye, he was not part of the military-personalist system coded by Geddes. Instead his SOLS were the groups that voted for his party in democratic elections. Thus, we code a SOLS change here. Nkurunziza ruled through 2008 with no further SOLS changes.

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