

## Haiti

### Rice

Due partially to political instability, Haiti was occupied by the United States from 1915-1934. In 1930, the occupying forces held a presidential election, which made Sténio Joseph Vincent, a Liberal, the new president of Haiti. COW (2011) codes Haiti regaining independence on August 15, 1934, and Vincent is in power on that date according to Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009). Because Haiti had not been independent for nearly twenty years, we will treat it as a newly independent state and not code a SOLS change for the first leader coming to power at re-independence. Haiti is considered authoritarian from the end of U.S. occupation in 1934 to 1945. Since 1945 to 2008 Haiti has experienced just 9 years as a democratic country according to our coding rules: 1990, 1994-1998, and 2006-2008. In all of these democratic years we code Haiti as a mixed system democracy, While Cheibub et al (2010) do not code these democratic years, each of them is coded as mixed via various sources (“1987 Constitution”; Calvert 2004, Moestrup 2007).

By 1935, Vincent had decided to seize more power for himself, ostensibly because his term in office was scheduled to end in May 1936 (Heinl 1996, 474). He did this by first transferring exclusive economic control to the Presidency, then by dissolving the legislature, and finally by drafting a new constitution that gave him the power to dissolve the legislature and govern by decree—effectively abolishing the separation of powers and making the executive dominant. He was also given the power to appoint ten out of twenty-one senators, and choose the rest from a slate of candidates (Heinl 1996, 474). This new constitution was ratified in June 1935, and Vincent “succeeded himself” in 1936 (Heinl 1996, 475). Vincent’s regime fits into Geddes’ (2003) category of personalist because, first, Vincent lacked the support of a party and yet was in power. Second, Vincent controlled the government entirely, including the military and the legislature. Vincent’s “second term” was confirmed through the same referendum that amended the constitution—a process that was called “even more of a farce than most popular votes [in Haiti]” by the British ambassador (Heinl 1996, 474). Therefore, we believe that Vincent’s regime was, in fact, personalist.

Vincent officially declared Haiti to be a dictatorship in 1938 (Heinl 1996, 484). However, shortly thereafter, in 1941, thanks in part to American pressure, Vincent decided not to run for “reelection” another time. He was succeeded by Louis Elie Lescot, who had previously served as the Haitian minister in Washington DC. Lescot, like Vincent, did not have an official party affiliation, and was not Vincent’s pre-designated successor by any means (as Vincent meant to succeed himself in 1941). Therefore, we chose to code this transfer of power as a SOLS change. Lescot’s ascension to power did not signal a return to democracy, and it would appear that he established his own personalist regime (according to Geddes 2003), which included his taking control of the armed forces, and the Port-au-Prince police. Lescot immediately rewrote the Constitution of 1935, resulting in an extended term of office, and also stating that he would succeed himself in office. These characteristics place him firmly in the personalist category. The

lack of a party affiliation excludes him from the single-party category, and he was not a member of the military. He retained Haiti's close ties with the United States, and remained in office until 1946.

From January to August of 1946, Franck Lavaud took power as president of the Military Executive Committee, a three man junta that ran Haiti after the resignation of Lescot. This is not coded as a SOLS change on account of the fact that this junta was intended to be (and served as) a temporary government.

The Military Executive Committee served until August when the national assembly of Haiti convened to elect a president. Dumarsais Estimé was chosen as the leader. Geddes (2003) does not code a particular regime type for Estimé. This is a SOLS change as Estimé was not a pre-designated successor of Lescot and Lescot's personalist regime is coded as having ended according to Geddes (2003). Estimé (non-party) served until his deposition in another military-led transitional coup in 1950, in which Magloire took power. Magloire had been active in the military coup that ousted President Lescot in 1946 and served under Lavaud in the subsequent ruling military junta. While Lavaud officially became president of the new post-Estimé governing junta, his power had been eclipsed by that of Magloire (US Library of Congress 1989). Magloire went on to be officially "elected" president in December 1950. This leadership change to Magloire is coded as a SOLS change. Magloire ruled until 1956, when he refused to step down from office on the agreed upon date. This move triggered serious rioting and protests, ultimately ending in Magloire's flight to Jamaica. The parliament installed Joseph Pierre-Louis to the presidency as a temporary leader.

1957 was an extremely complicated year in Haitian political history. Pierre-Louis was removed by parliament in February, and they then placed Franck Sylvaïn in charge as the next provisional leader. He was driven out by the military in April, when Army Chief of Staff Léon Cantave took over the government for several days. Haiti was then run from April to May by an Executive Government Council, which is not included on the spreadsheet. The military soon resumed control with Cantave back in power for five days in May, until Pierre Fingolé was appointed to power until mid-June. After the military removed Fingolé, they installed Antonio Kebreau from their own ranks to temporarily run the country as chairman of a military council. The military finally facilitated elections with universal suffrage in October, resulting in François Duvalier becoming the president of Haiti. He was backed partially by a personalist political group called the National Unity Party (PUN).

For 1957, we code a SOLS change with Kebreau (mil). This is because although Kebreau was a temporary appointed leader, he had an alliance with Duvalier. Thus, we consider Duvalier's personalist regime that was distinct from Magloire's started with Kebreau's inauguration. Regarding the situation after Magloire, US Library of Congress (1989) summarizes: "The period between the fall of Magloire and the election of Duvalier in September 1957 was a chaotic one, even by Haitian standards. Three provisional presidents held office during this

interval; one resigned and the army deposed the other two, Franck Sylvain and Fignolé. Duvalier is said to have engaged actively in the behind-the-scenes intrigue that helped him to emerge as the presidential candidate that the military favored. The military went on to guide the campaign and the elections in a way that gave Duvalier every possible advantage.” (US Library of Congress 1989). For other administrations before Kérékou, they are not considered as SOLS changes, because each leader was provisional leader.

Duvalier’s rule lasted until 1971, when his personalist regime continued after his death under the watch of his son Jean-Claude Duvalier. As Jean-Claude’s father named his son the heir to Haiti’s political control, this transition was not coded as a SOLS change; however, it should be noted that the PUN disbanded after the former leader’s death.

Geddes (2003) codes Haiti in 1950-1985 as a pure-Personalist regime. The younger Duvalier ruled much in the style of his father until 1986, when massive rioting and demonstrations ultimately forced him to give up control of the government to a national council under the control of Lieutenant General Henri Namphy. This was a SOLS change, as Namphy took power for two years under a military regime.

The military stayed in power as Haiti’s government attempted to write a new constitution. Elections were attempted in 1987, but they went awry with a massacre near a voting station. In 1988, Leslie Manigat of the Rally of Nationalist and Progressive Democrats (RDNP) won what was widely considered a fraudulent election, only to be deposed four months later by the military. Late in the same year, the army removed Namphy from power. However, he was ousted by noncommissioned officers of the presidential guard who replaced him with Lieutenant General Prosper Avril.

Regarding Manigat’s entry and exit, we do not code SOLS changes, because Manigat was a Namphy’s puppet (see Danner 2003, 105; Wucker 2000, 125). Regarding the leadership change from Namphy to Avril on September 17 is coded as minor SOLS change because while Namphy had military support, Avril had both military support and the support of a personalist clique. Additionally, the military-personalist regime coded by Geddes (2003) starts with Avril.

Avril continued the military rule through 1990, when in March protests and demonstrations forced his resignation. Another military leader, Lieutenant General Hérard Abraham, took office as the interim head of government. He quickly surrendered power to the Chief Justice, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, who led a provisional government until 1991. None of these transitions are coded as SOLS changes.

In February 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected in a fair and democratic process to the Haitian presidency. He was a member of the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD), and his ascension to power was coded as a SOLS change. However, a military coup in September removed him from office, signifying another SOLS change. Raoul Cédras came to power, and served as the effective leader until 1994.

Under threat of international invasion due to human rights violations, Cédras and his government agreed to step down and allow Aristide to return to power in September 1994. Aristide was again backed by the FNCD, as well as a new political organization called the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL). Elections in 1996 saw the ascension of another OPL candidate, René Garcia Préval. No SOLS change was coded for this transition.

In 2001, former president Aristide again was elected, this time in hardly fair and free elections. He led his own personalist political party, the Lavalas Family (FL). However, Aristide was a pre-designated successor of Preval and Geddes (2003) codes the period from 1999-2004 as a single personalist regime. Therefore, we do not code this as a SOLS change.

Aristide resigned after the country was essentially in civil war by 2004. Boniface Alexandre, as the Chief Justice, became the provisional leader with no political party; rather, he was essentially propped up by international peacekeeping orders.

Muller et al (2011, 592) describes that “President Aristide resigned on February 29 and was flown to exile on a U.S. aircraft. Concurrently, U.S. President G. Bush ordered the dispatch of 500 marines to Port-au-Prince, with France announcing that 200 of its troops would be similarly deployed and the UN Security Council authorizing the formation of a multinational interim peacekeeping force. In the wake of Aristide’s departure, his constitutionally designated successor, Supreme Court President Boniface Alexandre, was sworn as acting head of government on March 8, 2004....After four postponements, presidential and legislative elections were held on February 7, 2006.” While Alexandre is a provisional leader with no political party, he stays in power for nearly two years, and thus cannot be coded as an interim leader by our rules, even though he clearly was a caretaker. Therefore, a SOLS change is coded.

Finally, in 2006, former president Préval was elected with the backing of the Fwon Lespwa Party (FLP). He has been in power since.

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