

Ecuador

Vanderbilt

Ecuador is considered non-democratic from 1919 through 1945. From 1895-1925 Ecuador experiences “three stormy decades of rule by the Radical Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Radical: PLR), commonly referred to as the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal)” (US Library of Congress 1989). Between 1945 and 1978 Ecuador is classified as an autocracy except for two years (1968-1969). While Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) codes Ecuador as democratic in 1968 and 1969 Cheibub et al. (2010) does not. Given this difference we choose to code these years as a presidential democracy following Schlager et al. (2006). According to Geddes (2003), Ecuador was a personalist regime from 1944 to 1946 and from 1970 to 1971. Also, she codes Ecuador as a military regime from 1963 to 1965 and from 1972 to 1978. After 1979, Ecuador experienced a transition to democracy in the frame of the third wave of democratization in Latin America. In the last two years of the observation period Ecuador is again coded as a non-democracy.

Note, however, that the Liberal Party itself was heavily divided and characterized by power struggles and “[r]eal power during this second half of the period of Liberal rule was held, not by the government, but by a plutocracy of coastal agricultural and banking interests, popularly known as *la argolla* (the ring), whose linchpin was the Commercial and Agricultural Bank of Guayaquil led by Francisco Urbina Jado. This bank gained influence by loaning vast quantities of money to the free-spending government as well as to private individuals. According to Ecuadorian historian Oscar Efrén Reyes, the bank was influential “to the point that candidates for president and his ministers, senators, and deputies had to have the prior approval of the bank” (US Library of Congress 1989).

The significant divisions within the party and the strong influence of non-party outsiders indicate that the system should not be characterized as single-party rule. Ecuador is more accurately characterized as an oligarchy at the time, with member of *la argolla*, forming the crucial support basis for PLR leaders until 1925. Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno of the Ecuadorian Radical Liberal Party (PLR) served as president from 1916 to 1920. In 1920 José Luis Tamayo Terán, PLR, became president. In 1924 Gonzalo Segundo Córdova y Rivera, PLR, became president. Following our oligarchy rule, we code no SOLS changes for any these leadership transitions.

In 1925, domestic unrest as a result of a declining economic situation led to the overthrow of Córdova in a bloodless coup by the League of Young Officers (US Library of Congress 1989). “Unlike all previous forays by the military into Ecuadorian politics, the coup of 1925 was made in the name of a collective grouping rather than a particular caudillo (US Library of Congress 1989).” The League had ambitious plans of reform and wanted to end the dominance of the PLR. They appointed Isidro Ayora Cueva as president (Cahoon 2012; US

Library of Congress 1989). This is a SOLS change as Ayora is not part of the oligarchic regime. We could not find enough sources to confirm Ayora's SOLS. While WSM codes it as CL (Contra-Liberal), no other sources confirm this. Therefore, we code unknown for him. Ayora was the rector of the Central University and the minister of social welfare. He pursued a variety of reforms, including the creation of a central bank, women's suffrage, welfare programs (such as pensions for state workers), and a new constitution. "The same constitution, Ecuador's thirteenth in just under a century as a republic, also provided for a powerful legislative body with authority to censure presidential ministers. This diminution of executive power, the appearance of a wide variety (socialist, communist, and populist) of new groupings in political competition with the traditional parties and with the military, and the devastating effects of the Great Depression combined to make Ecuador's political record especially unstable during subsequent years (US Library of Congress)." We code no specific authoritarian regime type under Ayora and during the subsequent period of instability until 1940.

Ayora was overthrown in a military coup in August 1931. US Library of Congress (1989) does not mention the next few leaders up until Juan de Dios Martínez Mera of Liberal Party¹ (PL) listed by Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009a) but instead notes: "Neptalí Bonifaz Ascázubi was then elected with the help of a quasi-fascist grouping of the *serrano* lower classes called the Consolidation of National Workers (Compactación Obrera Nacional). In August 1932, after various Liberal and leftist elements in Congress blocked Bonifaz's assumption of power, the Compactación fought a bloody four-day civil war against other paramilitary forces amassed by opponents of the president-elect. The latter were victorious, largely because the great majority of the government military forces remained in their barracks rather than defend Bonifaz."

This means that the country seems to have experienced significant instability and the leaders Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009a) lists are probably truly provisional. According to Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009a), the coup brought Luis Alberto Larrea Alba, Mil, to power as acting president (Cahoon 2012; Goemans et al. 2009b). This is not a SOLS change. In October 1931 Luis Larrea was "forced out of office after attempting to institute a dictatorship" (Maier 1971, 500). Alfredo Baquerizo Moreno of the Liberal Party (PL) became acting president (Cahoon 2012; Maier 1971, 484). This is not a SOLS change. In August 1932 Baquerizo Moreno resigned (Maier 1971, 500) and was replaced by Carlos Eduardo Freile Larrea of the Revolutionary Socialist Vanguard party (VR), nonelected, who took over as acting president (Cahoon 2012).² This is not a SOLS change. He was overthrown after five days in office (Maier

¹ WSM codes UR as his political affiliation. However, besides WSM, we could not find sources to confirm that Mera's sol is UR. Instead, we found several sources describing him as a Liberal Party member (The New Int'l YB 1934, 233; Political Handbook 1933, 155). Therefore, we choose to code PL.

² Cahoon (2012) seems to use the term "acting" to mean that the president was nonelected. Using Maier (1971) we were able to confirm that these "acting" presidents were indeed nonelected, though they were never designated "acting" or "interim" by those who appointed them. However, we go with "acting" since it seems to capture the fact that these were appointed and not elected officials who had no official "term" to speak of.

1971, 500) and Alberto Guerrero Martínez, PL, became acting president (Cahoon 2012, Lauderbaugh 2012, 100).

In December 1932 Juan de Dios Martínez Mera of the Republican Union (UR) became president. This is a SOLS change because he had a different SOLS from that of the last regular leader, Ayora. Ayora was a contra-liberal, while Martínez Mera “was the candidate of the Liberal Coalition” (Lauderbaugh 2012, 100). Because of fraudulent elections, Quito experienced demonstrations and there were pressure for Martínez Mera to resign. “The campaign against Martínez was led by the charismatic president of the Chamber of Deputies, José María Velasco Ibarra...” (US Library of Congress 1989). In 1933 the Ecuadorian Senate impeached Martínez Mera “and instructed his minister of interior” Abelardo Montalvo Alvear, PLR, “to assume the office on an interim basis” (Cahoon 2012; Maier 1971, 488). This is not a SOLS change.

In 1934 José María Velasco Ibarra of the Democratic Alliance (AD) “assumed the presidency after having won popular elections by an overwhelming margin” (US Library of Congress 1989). This is a SOLS change since he was Martínez Mera opponent. “[Velasco Ibarra] was overthrown by the military after attempting to assume dictatorial powers by dissolving Congress and jailing his congressional opponents” (US Library of Congress 1989). Antonio Pons Campuzano, PLR, became acting president in August 1935 (Cahoon 2012). This is not a SOLS change. A month later Pons “handed over the reins of government to the military” (Maier 1971, 501). In September 1935 Federico Páez Chiriboga, Non-Party, was put in power by the military (Cahoon 2012; Maier 1971, 501). “Páez ruled precariously for two years, first with the political support of the socialist left and then with that of the right” (US Library of Congress 1989). This is a SOLS change since Páez was not Velasco Ibarra’s pre-designated successor, but instead put in office by those who removed Velasco Ibarra.

Páez used increasingly authoritarian strategies and lost the support of the military (Capello 2011, 175). In 1937 Páez resigned when he “was overthrown by his minister of national defense, General Alberto Enríquez Gallo,” Mil (US Library of Congress 1989). This is a SOLS change. After implementing a number of reforms and trying to create a balanced representation of Conservatives, Liberals, and Socialists Enríquez stepped down voluntarily (Lauderbaugh 2012, 104). When the parliament was unable to agree on a successor, in August 1938 Manuel María José del Espíritu Santo Borrero González, PL, took over as “interim” president (Cahoon 2012; Capello 2011, 175; Maier 1971, 502). This is not a SOLS change.

In October Aurelio Mosquera Narváez, PL, became president. This is a SOLS change since there is no indication that he was the last regular leader’s, Enríquez, pre-designated successor. In November 1939 Mosquera Narváez unexpectedly died while in office and president of the senate Carlos Alberto Arroyo del Río, PL, took over as interim president (Cahoon 2012; Maier 1971, 502). This is not a SOLS change. Three weeks later in December 1939 Andrés Fernández de Córdova Nieto, PL, replaced Arroyo del Río “who resigned in order to run in the

1940 presidential election” (Maier 1971, 502). This is not a SOLS change. In August 1940 Julio Enrique Moreno Peñaherrera, Non-Party, took over “for less than a month until elections were held” (Maier 1971, 503) to become acting president (Cahoon 2012). This is not a SOLS change.

The elections pitted Arroyo del Río, long term liberal leader, against Jijon, a conservative, and Velasco Ibarra, who had mass following. When it looked like Velasco Ibarra would win, the government declared Arroyo del Río as victor instead. This is a SOLS change, because we code the Arroyo government as a new personalist regime. It is firstly because he had only won the election by fraud, which was believed to have been won by Velasco. To maintain his power, he relied on repression to control those people who supported Velasco. The leader personally controlled the security apparatus (Lauderbaugh 2012, 107). The corps of carabineers became increasingly important. He managed to remain in office despite his repressive ruling, because of the economic support by the US and the increased exportation due to the World War II.

In 1944 Arroyo del Río resigned after a disastrous war with Peru (US Library of Congress 1989). He was followed first by Navarro Allende (non-party) for one day and then Larrea Alba for one day. It is very difficult to find information on these two, but given the short time in office it seems they would have been provisional.³ These are not SOLS changes.

In July 1944 elections for Congress were held in which the ADE party triumphed with 37 out of 58 representatives. The first act of this new body was to appoint José María Velasco Ibarra as regular president of Ecuador until 1948. According to Geddes (2003), Velasco Ibarra ruled as a personalist leader between 1944 and 1946. The transition from Arroyo del Río to Velasco is a SOLS change. Even though Velasco was presented initially an interim president, it was clear that he was the leader of the revolution, and so, he was declared president some month later. In addition, he was not Arroyo’s pre-designated successor, but had been Arroyo’s competitor in the previous election. He relied on his personalist clique rather than the Liberals.

By 1947, arguing that the country experienced an unstoppable economic and political chaos, Colonel Carlos Mancheno, Ministry of Defense, overthrew Velasco Ibarra in August. Due to the lack of popular support to remain in office, Velasco signed his resignation letter and flew to his third political exile. Mancheno was president from August to September 1947 when he was deposed by another wing of the military. Mariano Suarez Veintimilla, Velasco’s vice president, assumed power as president for a short period of time, 14 days. He “promised to serve only until Congress would appoint a new presented (Lauderbaugh 2012, 112)” and can thus be seen as a caretaker.⁴ After Suarez, Carlos Arosemena Tola assumed the presidency for 11 months

³ It seems that Navarro Allende was the Vice President of the Senate and Arroyo handed him power (U.S. Department of State 1967, 1037).

⁴ See also a news article in The Evening Independent from September 3, 1947. Available at <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=950&dat=19470903&id=mKcLAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IIUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=3644,1451729>

until the end of the Velasco Ibarra's term. Both Suarez and Arosemena can be considered caretakers and thus there is no SOLS change. Arosemena called for presidential elections in June 1948 in which the Liberal Galo Plaza Lasso won. This starts a brief democratic period in Ecuador's history.

The transition from Velasco Ibarra to Mancheno is considered as a SOLS change 30. This is because Mancheno does not seem an interim leader. According to Lauderbaugh (2012, 112), although Mancheno was a loyalist to Velasco before he resigned his position of minister of defense when Velasco began excluding him from high-level cabinet meetings, by the time he was called upon to be minister of defense once again in Velasco's government, he had no loyalty to Velasco, rather he sought an opportunity for revenge against Velasco. Thus, we do not treat him as an interim leader. The transition from Mancheno to Suarez Veintimilla is not a SOLS change since Suarez Veintimilla was the last regular leader's (Velasco's) vice president and can thus be treated as a pre-designated successor.⁵ In addition, Arosemena Tola was elected on an interim basis (Maier 1971). Thus, this is no SOLS change, either.⁶

However, in 1948, the change from Arosemena Tola to Plaza is a SOLS change because Plaza belonged to a different coalition than Velasco Ibarra. Plaza was a candidate of the Movimiento Civico Ecuatoriano (MCDN), was elected president. This is a SOLS change. According to Lentz (1994, 237) and Bethell (1991, 704-5), Plaza Lasso was the candidate of MCDN for the presidency. Therefore, his main SOLS should be MCDN, rather than PL. Plaza Lasso was supported by a number of Liberal Party (PL) voters, and Plaza Lasso was the son of an important Liberal president, but there was a different official Liberal candidate. Therefore, Plaza Lasso's SOLS should be MCDN.

Galo Plaza finished his term in 1952 and turned power over to his elected successor Velasco Ibarra of the FNV (National Velasquista Federation) who again became president. He won the elections against the liberal candidate Jose Ricardo Chiriboga. Since Velasco was not Galo Plaza's pre-designated successor and had a different party from Galo Plaza, this is a SOLS change (MCDN, FNV) (TIME Magazine 1952).

Prior to the 1956 elections, the velasquista movement and ARNE (Ecuadorian Nationalist Revolutionary Action) nominated Quito's ex-major, but as the campaign advanced, Velasco practically ignored the official candidate, supporting instead his former minister Camilo Ponce Enriquez. Ponce was the candidate for the Conservative Party and his own MSC (Social Christian Movement). In that elections, Ponce resulted winner. Although Ponce Enriquez was a minister in Velasco's government, he ran for the election as a candidate of the Conservatives

⁵ Though Suarez Veintimilla is also probably an interim leader, his status as pre-designated successor alone justifies coding no SOLS change here (St. Petersburg Times 1947).

⁶ However, it should be noted that we could code a SOLS change with Suarez. This is because in Ecuador, vice presidents need not be from the same party as presidents and the vice president may not be seen as the pre-designated successor. However, since we do not have a clear coding rule on this issue, we code no SOLS change for the transition from Mancheno to Suarez Veintimilla for now.

which was different from Velasco's sols: Federación Nacional Velasquista (National Velasquista Federation (FNV) (Janda 1980; Martz 1980). According to Martz (1980), "Three candidates entered the competition with Guevara Moreno. Camilo Ponce Enriquez, Velasco's Minister of Government during much of his term, represented the Conservatives and his own personalistic Movimiento Social Cristiano (MSC); the Liberals nominated Raul Clemente Huerta Rendon, a prominent guayaquileño; and the 1952 Liberal standard bearer, former Quito mayor Jose Ricardo Chiriboga Villagomez, ran on his own." In addition, US Library of Congress (1989) lists Ponce's own party: MSC, as one of the major personalist movements. Thus, Ponce Enriquez was not Velasco's pre-designated successor and his election victory and assumption of presidency in 1956 is coded as a SOLS change.

In the 1960 election, Velasco Ibarra ran again for the office of the president, pursuing his fourth term. Velasco was elected with Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy as vice-president. This time Velasco ran for president representing his own movement against the Conservative candidate Gonzalo Cordero Crespo. So, because Ponce was elected for the Conservative Party (with the support of Velasco), and Velasco was later elected for a different movement and was not the pre-designated successor of Ponce, this change is a SOLS change.

The new Velasco's government could not accomplish all promises made in the campaign. The economic situation of the country worsened, and the political situation became strained. The velasquismo broke into different factions, and the vice-president became the leader of the opposition faction in July 1961. As president of the Congress, he declared himself as president in November. Infuriated, Velasco turned to the military to re establish the order. The different factions of the military were dubious about what to do in that situation. Some days later, Velasco decided to arrest the vice-president, even though the Congress declared itself against this measure. One group of the military proposed to designate Camilo Gallegos, president of the Supreme Court, as president, because this group argued that both the president and the vice-president had violated the constitution; so only the judiciary was left flawless. However, while Gallegos was organizing his government, the vice-president of the Senate managed to release Arosemena. After that, the Congress declared Arosemena the constitutional president. According to Lentz (1994, 238) "Arosemena served as vice president under Velasco Ibarra from Sep. of 1960. Arosemena and Velasco clashed over the government's economic policies and relationship with the US." Although he was Velasco's vice president, Arosemena (a member of the National Revolutionary party: PNR) was not a pre-designated successor. Hence we code a SOLS change.

Due to Arosemena's speeches against the U.S., his initial closeness to the communist bloc, and his drunken behavior, the military decided to take action. In July 11, several hundred officers met and decided in favor of an immediate military takeover. No one defended Arosemena or opposed the creation of a military government. Later, the military's decision was officially announced, but Arosemena refused to resign. Finally, he was deported to Panama, and a Junta was installed led by the Naval Commander Ramon Castro as president and official spokesman of the junta. Therefore, this change is a SOLS change and inaugurated a military

regime according to Geddes (2003). The military regime installed a harsh repression in the country against students mainly. In addition, the military junta faced several national strikes during its term. Furthermore, the military was weakened by internal divisions. At the same time, in 1966 opposition political parties reached an agreement and proposed the independent politician Clemente Yerovi, as their candidate to replace the junta until an elected assembly could choose the next president. The military wanted the interim president to be of military rank, but internal problems in the military and a calculated maneuver made by opposition parties lead to the resignation of the junta and the assumption of Yerovi as provisional president (Cahoon 2012). Yerovi immediately called for elections to select a new constitutional assembly. Otto Arosemena was elected as interim president with the support of the Conservative party until new presidential elections were held in 1968. The change from Castro to Yerovi is not a SOLS change because the latter was interim president. The change from Yerovi to Arosemena is a SOLS change because Arosemena was not the pre-designated successor of Castro and he should not be considered interim according to our rules since he remained in office more than 18 months. Indeed, Arosemena's election marked the end of the military regime.

In 1968, Ecuador is coded as democratic. In that year new presidential elections were held in which Jose Velasco Ibarra won the presidency for the fifth time for the velasquismo movement. This change also is a SOLS change because Velasco belonged to his own movement and he not to the Democratic Institutional Coalition, the Arosemena's party. Even Velasco was electoral elected president, in June 1970 he declared himself as dictator, finished this short democratic period in Ecuador. Starting in 1970, Geddes (2003) codes him as establishing his own personalist system. We do not code a SOLS change in 1970 since Velasco Ibarra was already in power before. In 1972, Velasco Ibarra was deposed for the fourth time by a military coup, and was exiled. This military coup installed General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara as president, and inaugurated a new military regime in Ecuador according to Geddes (2003). Therefore, the change from Velasco to Rodriguez means a SOLS change. The military interregnum lasted 7 years in which Guillermo Rodriguez was replaced by Commander Alfredo Poveda, but this change does not mean a SOLS change.

In January 1978 a referendum took place and a new constitution was approved. New national elections were called to July 1978. The second round took place in April 1979 in which Jaime Roldos was elected president for the Concert of the Popular Forces (CFP), inaugurating a new democratic period in the country. Unfortunately, after two years, he died in a plane crash in May 1981. After his death, Osvaldo Hurtado, the vice president, constitutionally assumed the presidency for the rest of the term. The change from the military to Roldos, a democratically elected president backed by the CFP party, is a SOLS change. The change from Roldos to Hurtado is also a SOLS change because was affiliated with the DP-UDC (People's Democracy-Christian Democrat Union), a different party than Roldos' CFP (Concert of the Popular Forces).

From 1979 to 1996, even though Ecuadorian presidents experienced several problems in this period, they successfully ended their respective terms and democracy was relatively stable.

After the moderate government of Roldón-Hurtado, Febres Cordero won the elections for the Social-Christian Party (PSC) with a rightist discourse. He was elected for the period 1984-1988. Borja took office in 1988, after defeated Abdalá Bucarín in runoff. He arrived to the presidency with a reformist discourse, closer to a leftist position. In his period as president, Ecuador began to show the first signs of the severe economic crisis of the future years. After Borja's term, marked by a galloping economic crisis, Durán Ballén arrived to the presidency for the Republican Union Party in 1992 with the promise to stabilize the country. In 1996 Abdala Bucaram arrived to the presidency for the Roldosista Ecuatorian Party (PRE) under a populist discourse, but once in office he followed the neoliberal program. His informal behavior soon created foes in the media and among Ecuadorian intellectuals who highlighted his unwise decisions and evidence of corruption of some of his main close members of his government. All these changes are SOLS changes because each president belonged to a different party.

In the meantime the indigenous movement joined a heterogeneous coalition together with workers' unions, interest groups (feminist, human rights activist, ecologists), industrial trades, bankers, and traders. They promoted a *Paro Cívico Nacional* (National Civic Strike) on February 5, 1997. These protests were broadcast nationally, forcing the Congress to act. Forced by the pressure of the protests, the Congress decided unconstitutionally to remove Bucarín from office, arguing mental disability. Moreover, after dismissing Bucarín, the *golpista* coalition who controlled the Congress, did not follow the constitutional succession. They jumped over vice president Rosalia Serrano, and they appointed Fabián Alarcón as interim president. This decision was supported by the military. Alarcon ruled a chaotic government. Lacking electoral legitimacy, he called a referendum, an election for a Constitutional Assembly, and general elections to form a new government. His interim presidency was briefly interrupted by Arteaga Serrano. None of these are SOLS changes given that these leaders are interim (The Europa World Yearbook 2004, 1497) lists both Alarcón and Arteaga Serrano as interim presidents. In addition, Alarcón was in power for exactly 18 months, which is the maximum time allowed to be "interim" in our coding rule.

After elections, Jamin Mahuad took office in 1998 for the People's Democracy-Christian Democrat Union (DP-UDC) and implemented a rightist program. He had to face a severe economic crisis in which was the worst economic reversal of the century in Ecuador. Jamin Mahuad's assumption of office is a SOLS change since Mahuad's party is different from Bucaram's. Mahuad experienced a government marked by political and economic crises. These crises lead to several mobilizations and demonstrations. The Mahuad government mobilized security forces to keep the roads open and the indigenous away from the capital. When over 10,000 protesters concentrated in Quito on January 19, 2000, however, it became clear that the security forces had failed. On January 21 the colonel Lucio Gutierrez, CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, and former Supreme Court chief Carlos Solórzano proclaimed themselves a Junta of National Salvation. In the end, however, the junta lasted less than a day and none of these men are listed as leader by Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009a). The next day the Generals of

the Army decided to support the Vice President Gustavo Noboa, and proclaimed him as a president. So, this change is not a SOLS change because Noboa as a vice-president is the official successor of Mahuad and they belonged to the same party.

In 2003 the Colonel Lucio Gutierrez won presidential elections for the Party Patriotic Society (PSP). In April 2005, after several demonstrations due to unconstitutional measures, the opposition members of the Congress unconstitutionally declared the vacancy of the presidency, and they designed the vice president Alfredo Palacio as the new Ecuadorian president. This decision was corroborated by the military. Gutierrez left the Carondelet Palace by helicopter and sought asylum in the Brazilian embassy. Palacio took office in the middle of the crisis. In this context, the protesters wanted the president to dissolve the Congress, but he refused to. In addition, he calmed down the social unrest, designated a technocrat government, and called an election for Constitutional Assembly to replace the Constitution of 1998. We code this transition according to the rules for presidential democracies since this is how this case is coded. Although Palacio was Gutierrez's vice-president; the change from Gutierrez to Palacio is a SOLS change because Gutierrez belonged to the PSP while Palacio belonged to Democracy Popular (DP).

Correa won the general elections of 2006 for the Country Alliance movement (AP), promising a leftist government with a populist discourse. He took advantage of the anti-political mood, presenting himself as an outsider. This is a SOLS change.

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