

Peru

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Peru is considered authoritarian from 1919 through 1945. Geddes, Wright, Frantz (2013) do not provide coding for Peru pre-1945. José Simón Pardo y Barreda of the Civilista Party (PC) served as president from 1915 to 1919. In 1919 Augusto Bernardino Leguía y Salcedo of the Democratic Reformist Party (PDR) “staged a preemptive coup and assumed the presidency” (US Library of Congress 1992). This is a SOLS change. According to Keen and Haynes (2012, 416), he “established a personal dictatorship.” Clayton and Conniff ([1999] 2005, 277) write “Leguía was an urbane dictator, along the lines of Benito Mussolini in Italy and Primo de Rivera in Spain....He also recognized the importance of controlling coercive force, so he kept the army and navy loyal to him by providing them pay increases and expensive new armaments.” We code Leguía y Salcedo time in office as a personalist regime. According to US Library of Congress (1992), “After 1930 both the military, now firmly allied with the oligarchy, and the forces of the left, particularly APRA [American Popular Revolutionary Alliance], became important new actors in Peruvian politics. This period (1930-68) has been characterized in political terms by sociologist Dennis Gilbert as operating under essentially a “tripartite” political system, with the military often ruling at the behest of the oligarchy to suppress the “unruly” masses.”

In August 1930 Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro “issued a manifesto to the nation and called on the rest of the armed forces to join his troops in revolt against the government. On August 24, Leguía resigned the presidency and handed over power to a hastily organized junta headed by his chief of staff, General Manuel Ponce” (Bethell 1991, 405). Manuel María Ponce Brousset, Mil, became provisional president (Rozman 1970, 550). This is not a SOLS change. Ponce and Sánchez Cerro had support from different factions of the military. “Following a vote taken among all army officers, Sánchez Cerro was designated to lead the military’s political endeavor” (Rozman 1970, 550) and two days after Ponce had taken office, Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro, Mil, “flew to Lima and made himself provisional president” (Bethell 1991, 405). “Sanchez purged and reassigned officers of doubtful loyalty, placing confidants in key positions (Loveman 1999, 90).” Sanchez also planned to compete in the elections without standing down from his provisional office (Bethell 1991, 412). Given that Sanchez did not become provisional president in a constitutional way, expresses interest in being “elected” for a longer term, and he started to place loyalists on key position, he should not be considered a provisional leader. He was also not Leguía pre-designated successor, having removed the latter from office. This is a SOLS change.

Regarding his regime, we code it as a military regime. While he tried to establish his own personalistic regime, he was unsuccessful. Danopoulos and Watson (1996, 345) and Tella (2005, 59) suggest military intervention into politics when Cerro came to power for the first time in 1930. While Sanchez was in office different groups in the military and among civilians clashed with one another. Sánchez Cerro was forced out of office by a group of supporters among the Arequipa constitutionalists. Under pressure, he “resigned and went into voluntary exile” (Bethell

1991, 412) in March 1931. Ricardo Leoncio Elías Arias head of the Supreme Court, “took over the provisional presidency” (Bethell 1991, 412). Four days later Sánchez Cerro’s former minister of government Gustavo A. Jiménez, Mil, overthrew Elías to become provisional president. Jiménez was one of the people behind Sanchez exile and led the new junta which had support mainly from Arequipa (O’Brien 1996, 149). While Jiménez might have called himself “provisional”, his junta seems to have had more long-term ambitions. This is not a SOLS change. Six days later David Samanez Ocampo y Sobrino became head of the provisional junta. This is not a SOLS change either. All three leaders can be seen as part of a military regime at the time.

In December 1931 Sánchez Cerro now of the Revolutionary Union party (UR) won elections to become president (Haring 1932, 329; Bethell 1991, 413). We code his regime starting in 1931 as personalist. While Sanchez Cerro was originally a military officer, his rank was relatively low and he had worked towards marginalizing the military during his first time in office and was removed by the military as a result. By the time of his “election” his main support was the a coalition of the upper class and peasant coalition against APRA, which represented mostly working and middle class interests.

Sánchez Cerro was assassinated in April 1933 and “Congress quickly elected former president Benavides to complete Sánchez Cerro's five-year term” (US Library of Congress 1992). Óscar Raymundo Benavides Larrea, Mil, became president. Benavides, a respected general who was largely uninvolved in Peruvian politics during Sanchez time in office, had been appointed by Cerro Sanchez to the commander of all Peruvian forces in 1933 to give himself and the war effort against Colombia some more legitimacy. After Sanchez was assassinated, congress chose Benavides to fulfill Sanchez’ term. Benavides’ became president despite the fact that no active member of the military could hold this office according to the constitution. The old oligarchy supported his appointment, because of his accomplishments against the leftists APRA movement, which had caused domestic unrest already under Sanchez (Loveman and Davies 1997, 96). He depended on no particular party, but had the support of military (Loveman and Davies 1997, 99). Benavides immediately set out to avoid war with Colombia, which antagonized the supporters of Sanchez Cerro in congress. In November 1933, Benavides then disbanded the cabinet he had taken over from Sanchez-Cerro, suggesting that he was moving even further away from his predecessor (Masterson 1991, 52-55). A high-ranking military officer, Benavides ruled with support by the military, which built up during his presidency with weapons purchases, training, and spending. He also did not interfere much with the military hierarchy. The military was quite fractionalized at the time and Benavides seem to have ensured that his rule was propped up by another pillar of support-- moderate reformist and center-right civilians, including the more moderate parts of the upper class. We thus code his regime as a military-personalist regime and, since he was not a pre-designated successor of Sanchez Cerro, we code a SOLS change.

When Benavides's term ended in 1939 Manuel Prado y Ugarteche of the Conservative Coalition (CC) won elections to become president. Prado was close to Benavides. He was the "government nominee" (Alexander and Parker 2007, 24). Aggarwal (1996, 306) also writes "in 1939, Benavides finally succeeded where he had failed three years earlier: he secured the election of his chosen successor, Manuel Prado." Prado could be seen as a continuation of Benavides personalist regime, without the military pillar of support. However, he was elected in a limited suffrage election, which is characteristic of an oligarchic system, and is often viewed as a representative of the wealthy elite. Mainwaring (1995, 329) comments that Benavides had succeeded at "integrating the oligarchic factions and consolidating the anti-APRISTA front" and that Prado was a "ranking member of the oligarchy." Prado also ended up accepting APRA support for the presidential election, and in return legalized the party when he won (TIME Magazine 1959). Furthermore, "From 1939 to 1945, the elected president, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, wielded these executive powers moderately. He by and large respected the rules of the game. He also gradually incorporated the APRA party into politics (though he did not formally legalize it until just before his term ended). (Levitt 2012, 11)" He also accepted democratic elections at the end of his regime. Therefore, there are few indicators of a personalist rule and his regime is probably most accurately viewed as oligarchic and his assumption of office is a SOLS change.

The Allied victory in World War II reinforced the relative democratic tendency in Peru, as Manuel Prado y Ugarteche's term came to an end on July 28, 1945. Jos Luis Bustamante y Rivero, who ran for president as a candidate for the FDN, was overwhelmingly elected as a president and took office on July 28, 1945. This is coded as a SOLS change because the two parties are on opposing ends of the political spectrum. On October 29, 1948, following economic problems and unrest, Bustamante was overthrown in a military coup. This is another SOLS change.

As a result of the coup on October 29, 1948, General Jose Manuel Arturo Odría Amoretti (Mil) became the new president. According to Geddes (2003), Odría imposed a personalist-military dictatorship on the country. On June 1, 1950, Odría handed over chairmanship of the military junta to his deputy, Zenón Noriega Aguero. However, this is not coded as a SOLS change because Geddes (2003) codes the personalist-military regime as continuing. Aguero was a 'designated successor' and also a high-ranking military official. Furthermore, Aguero took power so that Odría could run for president as a representative of the PRP (Partido Restaurador del Perú)—the only party in the elections. Odría regained office on July 28, 1950 (Masterson 2009, 151).

The next SOLS change came with the democratic elections held in 1956 (in which Odría was not a candidate). Manuel Prado y Ugarteche returned to office with the support of the leftist APRA. His party was the Pradista Democratic Movement/Peruvian Democratic Movement (MDP). Prado took office on July 18, 1956. In 1962, when the lack of a clear majority winner in

the democratic presidential elections led to a deal to put Odría back in the presidency, there was a military coup led by Ricardo Pérez Godoy on July 18, 1962 (Masterson 2009, 159). This is a SOLS change. Geddes (2003) codes a military regime for the year 1962.

A reform-minded junta firstly headed by General Ricardo Perez Godoy held power for a year (from June 18, 1962 to March 3, 1963), and then the junta was led by Nicolas Lindley Lopez from March 3, 1963 to July 28, 1963. This is not a SOLS change. The junta appointed a commission to draft a new election code with the goal of preventing an aprista (APRA) candidate as a winner in the 1963 military-supervised elections. As a result of the elections, Fernando Belaúnde Terry won the presidency as a candidate of his own party, Acción Popular (AP – Werlich 1978, 279-280). This is a SOLS change since the Belaunde is not beholden to the military but his party. We also code a presidential democracy under Belaunde. With public discontent growing under Belaunde's leadership, the armed forces, this time led by General Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado (Mil), overthrew the Belaunde government on October 3, 1968 and established a period of military rule that lasted until 1980. This is again a SOLS change.

On August 30, 1975, President Alvarado stepped down because of health reasons and General Francisco Morales Bermudez, another leader of the coup, became the president on August 30, 1975. This is not a SOLS change, because both leaders have the military as their source of support. Morales Bermudez in 1977 called for elections to form a new Constitutional Assembly in June 1978. This assembly called for presidential elections in 1980, which were won in May 1980 by former president Belaunde of the AP. This is a SOLS change. The country then experienced approximately ten years of democracy.

Amid inflation, economic hardship, and terrorism, Alan Garcia Perez, the leader of the APRA, won the presidential election in 1985. The transfer of the presidency from Belaunde to Garcia on July 28, 1985, was Peru's first transfer of power from one democratically elected leader to another in 40 years. It was also a SOLS change. However, Garcia administration's was plagued by hyperinflation from 1988 to 1990 and voters chose Alberto Fujimori as president in 1990. Fujimori was supported by a new right-wing political party: Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría (New Majority/Change 90: NM-C'90). The entry of the Fujimori government is a SOLS change. For this brief period of Fujimori's leadership (1990-1991) we code Peru as a presidential democracy. This is in contrast to Cheibub et al. (2010) who do not code these years as democratic. Furthermore, while it seems that the 1979 Constitution (which was in place at the time), suggests a mixed system, since it refers to the government's responsibility to the congress, Cheibub et al. (2010) code previous governments under this constitution as pure-presidential (for more perspectives on coding these years see also Schalger 2006; Moestrup 2007). As such, we code a presidential system in line with Cheibub et al. (2010). On April 5, 1992, democratically elected Fujimori dissolved the Congress in an "auto-coup," revamped the constitution, and intervened in the Supreme Court. Large segments of the judiciary, the military and the media were co-opted by Fujimori. Geddes (2003) codes a personalist regime starting in 1992. However, this is not a SOLS change since a) according to our coding rules, we code no SOLS change

during a leaders tenure and b) we want to keep changes in institutions and changes in interests separate.

Media support for Fujimori was achieved through an elaborate network of corruption, run by the National Intelligence Service, engaging in bribery, blackmail, trumped-up legal charges and hostile corporate takeovers. Fujimori's constitutionally questionable decision to seek a third term, and subsequent tainted electoral victory in June 2000, brought political and economic turmoil. On September 16, the president, Alberto Fujimori, called for new general elections to be held as soon as possible. Two months later, Fujimori flew to Tokyo and sent his resignation via fax. After that, the opposition forces in the Congress named the president of the Congress Valentin Paniagua as interim president, which is not a SOLS change, and new elections were scheduled for April 2000. These elections were won by Alejandro Toledo of Perú Posible (Possible Peru - PP), which he had founded in 1994. This is a SOLS change. The Toledo government consolidated Peru's return to democracy. New elections on July 28, 2006 resulted in Garcia Pérez of the left-wing populist APRA winning the presidency. This is a SOLS change.

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