

Haiti

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Haiti is considered authoritarian from the end of U.S. occupation in 1934 to 1945. The U.S. allowed Haiti to hold elections while still under occupation. Sténio Joseph Vincent, whose SOLS is unknown, ruled as president from 1930 to 1941. We lack Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013) authoritarian regime type coding for this period, but, according to US Library of Congress (1989), Vincent had “absolute power” (but for U.S. influence). Since 1945 to 2008 Haiti has experienced just 9 years as a democratic country according to our coding rules: 1990, 1994-1998, and 2006-2008. In all of these democratic years we code Haiti as a mixed system democracy, While Cheibub et al (2010) do not code these democratic years, each of them is coded as mixed via various sources (“1987 Constitution”; Calvert 2004, Moestrup 2007). During the remaining years, the country was ruled by various autocratic leaders. For instance, from 1950 to 1985, Haiti was a personalistic regime, first under Magliore and then under the Duvalier family. After 1985 several military regimes ruled until 1993 (between 1988 and 1989 it was a hybrid: military-personalistic regime), and a personalistic regime under Preval and Aristide ruled from 1999 to 2003.

“In 1935 he forced through the legislature a new constitution, which....praised Vincent, and it granted the executive sweeping powers to dissolve the legislature at will, to reorganize the judiciary, to appoint ten of twenty-one senators (and to recommend the remaining eleven to the lower house), and to rule by decree when the legislature was not in session. Although Vincent implemented some improvements in infrastructure and services, he brutally repressed his opposition, censored the press, and governed largely to benefit himself and a clique of merchants and corrupt military officers” (US Library of Congress 1989). We code a personalist regime under Vincent.

Vincent hoped to run for a third term, but “the United States made it known that it would oppose such an extension” and so “accommodated the Roosevelt administration and handed power over to [Louis Léocardie] Élie Lescot” (US Library of Congress 1989). According to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013), Lescot established his own personalist regime and US Library of Congress (1989) also states that Lescot’s rule “paralleled that of Vincent in many ways.” “Lescot declared himself commander in chief of the military, and power resided in a clique that ruled with the tacit support of the Garde” (US Library of Congress 1989). The question is whether Lescot was Vincent’s pre-designated successor. It appears that after Vincent realized he would not get American support for a third term and he got a “pledge from Lescot to guarantee Vincent’s personal safety and the security of his property once the former assumed office” (Plummer 1992, 143), he threw his support behind Lescot. While Vincent did support Lescot, Lescot was not his hand-chosen successor. Therefore, this is a SOLS change.

From 1941 to 1946 Elie Lescot, a Mulatto, was the president of Haiti. He was not supported by a particular political party, hence we code his SOLS as unknown. Instead, he was the handpicked predecessor of the previous regime under the authoritarian Sténio Vincent. Hence the commander in chief of the military and his government was backed by the security forces of Haiti, called the “Garde.” “With President Elie Lescot (1941-1946), the army lost its autonomy as an institution and became totally subservient to the whims of the president.” (Laguerre 1993). Geddes (2003) codes Lescot’s regime as personalist.

“In January 1946, events came to a head when Lescot jailed the Marxist editors of a journal called *La Ruche* (The Beehive). This action precipitated student strikes and protests by government workers, teachers, and shopkeepers in the capital and provincial cities. In addition, Lescot's mulatto-dominated rule had alienated the predominantly black Garde. His position became untenable, and he resigned on January 11.” (US Library of Congress 1989). The Garde appointed a three member Military Executive Committee of government composed by his president Colonel Franck Lavaud, Majors Paul Magliore, and Antoine Levelt. The Guard promised to set a date for free elections and on May 1946 a National Assembly was elected. In August candidate Dumarsais Estime (non-party) was elected president.

The transition from Lescot to Lavaud is not coded as a SOLS change on account of the fact that this junta was intended to be (and served as) a temporary government. However, the change from Lavaud to Estimé is a SOLS change, because Estimé was not a pre-designated successor of Lescot and Lescot’s personalist regime is coded as having ended according to Geddes (2003). “Estimé, politically the most moderate of the three, drew support from the black population in the north, as well as from the emerging black middle class. The leaders of the military, who would not countenance the election of Juste Constant and who reacted warily to the populist Fignolé, also considered Estimé the safest candidate. After two rounds of polling, legislators gave Estimé the presidency” (US Library of Congress 1989). Geddes (2003) does not code a particular regime type for Estimé.

By 1950 the economic conditions on the island were harsh. Also, the elites were dissatisfied with the economic policies of Estimé which did not include them in the lucrative benefits of the government. The elites convinced the officer corps that Estimé was no longer the right ruler. As a consequence, Estimé was deposed by a military coup led by Magliore on May 1950. “[...] the army forced the president to resign on May 10, 1950. The same junta that had assumed power after the fall of Lescot reinstalled itself” (US Library of Congress 1989). The military again promised to celebrate elections. For that reason, Magliore, who had become the most powerful amid the military leaders, did not assume the role of president, but Lavaud did, because Magliore wanted to run for presidency. As expected, Magliore won the election against only token opposition, and governed with the support of the military and the elite. Geddes (2003) codes a personalist regime starting in 1950. Given Magliore’s dominant rule in the junta,

Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009) codes him as leader immediately after Estime leaves power. We code the transition from Estime to Magliore as a SOLS change.

Magliore stayed in office until 1956. That year the political situation deteriorated. The elites, who once had supported the government, criticized the regime and supported a different candidate in the coming elections in which Duvalier also was candidate. By December a coup was imminent. As a result, Magliore resigned and left the power to the Supreme Court. He abandoned the country and Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis, head of the Supreme Court, assumed as provisional president. As Smith (2009) writes “the objective of the new government was to restore public order and set a date for elections that the new government and the U.S. State Department anxiously hoped would be 15 May.” Therefore, the change from Magliore to Nemours Pierre-Louis is not a SOLS because the latter was a provisional ruler.

However, the next year, Nemours was replaced by a second provisional president, Franck Sylvain, by the National Assembly. As the situation deteriorated, the head of the army, General Léon Cantave assumed power as provisional ruler. In order to reach an agreement between the parties in conflict (Duvalierists and Camoquins), an Executive Council of Government was formed composed of representative of the presidential candidates: Déjoie, Duvalier, and Fignolé. Power was supposed to rotate among the representatives, but due to internal struggles, the Council collapsed some days later. As a consequence, in the middle of the chaos, Léon Cantave assumed again the presidency.

As Avril (1999) states “General Cantave, facing national chaos, invited the most prominent Presidential candidates to a meeting in his office. Thus, these political leaders could experience the effects of the artillery shells exploding inside the building. Aware of the danger, they quickly reached a consensus by proposing one of their numbers, Daniel Fignolé, as provisional president.” He was followed by another military officer, Antonio Kébreau who made secret deals with Duvalier who seizes power with this alliance. In the coming election, Duvalier was “elected” president of Haiti, launching a brutal dictatorship.

US Library of Congress (1989) summarizes: “The period between the fall of Magloire and the election of Duvalier in September 1957 was a chaotic one, even by Haitian standards. Three provisional presidents held office during this interval; one resigned and the army deposed the other two, Franck Sylvain and Fignolé. Duvalier is said to have engaged actively in the behind-the-scenes intrigue that helped him to emerge as the presidential candidate that the military favored. The military went on to guide the campaign and the elections in a way that gave Duvalier every possible advantage.”

For 1957, we code a SOLS change with Kébreau (mil). This is because although Kébreau was a temporary appointed leader, he had an alliance (or secret deals) with Duvalier. Thus, we consider Duvalier’s personalist regime that was distinct from Magliore’s started with Kébreau’s inauguration. For other administrations before Kébreau, they are not considered as SOLS changes,

because each leader was appointed as temporary. For example, Nemours, Sylvain and Fingnole were definitely provisions leaders (see also Cahoon 2012). Also, although Cantave and Kedreau were military leaders, it seems probably more appropriate to treat these leaders as provisional.

In February 1971, the National Assembly changed the Constitution, allowing Duvalier (known as Papa Doc) to name his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (known as Baby Doc), as his successor. The same year Francois Duvalier died and his son and pre-designated successor took office. So, this change is not a SOLS change. Geddes (2003) codes Haiti in 1950-1985 as a pure-Personalist regime.

In February 1986, Jean-Claude Duvalier lost the support of important groups, including the USA and the Haitian military, and also faced opposition led by the Catholic Church, peasants, students, and workers. As a consequence, Duvalier went into exile to France. This began a period of military rulers, starting with Henry Namphy. Geddes (2003) codes a military regime under Namphy until 1988. The transition between Duvalier, who relied on his and his father's personalist clique, and Namphy, who was a pure military leader is a SOLS change.

The military then held fraudulent elections and the National Council of Government (Conseil National de Gouvernement: CNG) led by Namphy declared Leslie F. Manigat of the small Coalition of Progressive National Democrats (Rassemblement des Démocrates Nationaux Progressistes: RDNP) the winner. However, Manigat was in power only 3-4 months until he was deposed by Namphy as a result of disagreements over military appointments (US Library of Congress 1989). Namphy then returned to power for three months as head of a military government until he himself was ousted by noncommissioned officers of the Presidential Guard who replaced him with Lieutenant General Prosper Avril (US Library of Congress 1989). According to Geddes (2003), Avril installed a military-personalist regime.

Regarding Manigat's entry and exit, we do not code SOLS changes because Manigat was a Namphy's puppet (see Danner 2003, 105; Wucker 2000, 125). Regarding the leader transition from Namphy to Avril, we code a minor SOLS change because while Namphy had military support, Avril had both military support and the support of a personalist clique. "Avril proceeded to purge the army command and the government cabinet in an attempt to solidify his position. In October, Avril arrested fifteen soldiers and noncommissioned officers who had helped to bring him to power" (US Library of Congress 1989).

After significant unrest in 1990, Avril resigned and first Abraham (Mil) became interim leader and shortly thereafter Pascal-Trouillot, Supreme Court judge, was sworn in as provisional President (OAS 1990). These are not SOLS changes.

In 1990, under Pascal-Trouillet, the democratic presidential elections were held and Jean-Bertrand Aristide was the winner with 67% of the voter turnout. This is a SOLS change since his support came from millions of voters of the FNCD (National Front for Change and Democracy

coalition), while the last regular leader, Avril, had military and clique support. The same year Aristide the military organized a coup d'état with the backing of the elite. Aristide was forced into exile, and Army chief Raoul Cedras took the power, installing a new military regime. This is a SOLS change.

In July 1994, due to an embargo of arms and fuel and the pressure of a UN-legitimized multinational force that arrived in Haiti, the Haitian military and Aristide reached an agreement that paved the way to Aristide's return. Therefore, in October 1994, he returned to office, inaugurating another short democratic period in Haiti. This is a SOLS change. Aristide was now affiliated with another multi-party coalition: OPL- Organization of Struggling People.

In 1996, Aristide's "dolphin", René Garcia Preval assumed the presidency in the first peaceful and democratic transfer of government. "In accordance with the constitutional bar on succeeding himself, President Aristide agreed to step aside and support a presidential election in December 1995. Rene Preval, a prominent Aristide political ally, took 88% of the vote, and was sworn in to a 5-year term on February 7, 1996, during what was Haiti's first-ever transition between two democratically elected presidents." (U.S. Department of State 2010). Therefore, this change is not a SOLS change because Preval belonged to the same party than Aristide.

By 1999, Preval dissolved the Parliament and ruled by decree, starting a personalist period according to Geddes (2003). In May 2000, elections were held, and Aristide won in a landslide victory for his new personalist political party (FL). There were doubts about the clearness of this election. The opposition parties claimed fraud and intimidation, backed by international organizations, such as the Organization of American States. (We do not code the election as democratic.) However, Preval denied the charges and refused to back down. Once, the new Parliament was installed, Aristide was elected president for a new term. This change is also not a SOLS change because Aristide was the pre-designated successor of Preval and Geddes (2003) codes the same personalist regime as continuing through 2004 when Aristide leaves office. Geddes (2003) codes Aristide's regime as a personalist regime.

In 2004, new demonstrations by unarmed students and armed insurrections took place. As a result, Aristide went into exile in February 2004, and judge Boniface Alexander took oath as provisional president. However, he stayed in office for more than 18 months. Therefore, this change is considered as a SOLS change based on our rules. This is a case where the 18 month cut-off is problematic because Boniface Alexander really was provisional. Banks et al. (2011, 592) describes that "President Aristide resigned on February 29 and was flown to exile on a U.S. aircraft. Concurrently, U.S. president G. Bush ordered the dispatch of 500 marines to Port-au-Prince, with France announcing that 200 of its troops would be similarly deployed and the UN Security Council authorizing the formation of a multinational interim peacekeeping force. In the wake of Aristide's departure, his constitutionally designated successor, Supreme Court president

Boniface Alexandre, was sworn as acting head of government on March 8, 2004....After four postponements, presidential and legislative elections were held on Feb. 7, 2006.”

In 2006, democratic election are held and García Preval is elected as president for a second term. We code this as a SOLS change since Preval was not Boniface pre-designated successor.

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