Lebanon
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Lebanon is considered authoritarian from independence in 1946 until 2005. Geddes regime type coding is missing from 1946 until 1989. (Interestingly, Cheibub et. al. have coded Lebanon as a parliamentary democracy from 1946 until 1975.) According to GWF, Lebanon should be considered under Syrian occupation from 1977 through 2005.

According to the U.S. Department of State, Lebanon's government is sectarian in nature. The 1943 National Pact called for representation of each of the major ethnic/religious groups in government: the president must always be a Maronite, the PM must always be a Sunni Muslim, the president of the National Assembly (Chamber of Deputies) must always be a Shi'a Muslim. In this way, the country was governed by a group of disparate sect leaders with the Maronite president as head of government. Each Maronite leader drew support from different regional alliances, and thus leaders competed for power amongst themselves. The Library of Congress writes: "The history of Lebanon during the 1943-76 period was dominated by prominent family networks and patron-client relationships. Each sectarian community had its prominent family: the Khuris, Shamuns, Shihabs, Franjiyahs, and Jumayyils for the Maronites; the Sulhs, Karamis, and Yafis for the Sunnis; the Jumblatts, Yazbaks, and Arslans for the Druzes; and the Asads and Hamadahs for the Shias (U.S. Library of Congress, 1987)." Presidents were elected by the Chamber of Deputies, a Shi'a body, and thus were not the pre-designated successors of their Maronite predecessors. Each individual attempt to hold onto power would diminish the standing of other Maronite leaders hoping to ascend the presidency (Makdisi 1996, 25); as such, other Maronite leaders functioned as the natural opposition of the serving president. Thus, each leadership change under this system represents a SOLS change, since the elected leaders were not pre-designated successors, vice presidents, or family members.

Béchara Khalil El-Khoury of the Destour Party (DP)[1] ruled as president at independence. There is no SOLS change at independence. Economic hardship, strikes, and disorder led to a loss of public trust in the administration. Sunni leaders stopped cooperating with El-Khoury, forcing his resignation. In 1952 El-Khoury "transferred authority" to the hands of army commander Fuad Chebab, Mil (Zisser 1994, 507). This is not a SOLS change since Chebab was acting (worldstatesmen.org). Five days later the Chamber of Deputies elected Camille Chamoun (also known as Shamun) president. Although Chamoun (or Shamun) was affiliated with the CB in the past, Chamoun had come to power with the support of the National Socialist Front (SNF) (Beshara 2005 37-39). This is a SOLS change since Shamun was an important leader of the anti-El-Khoury movement (U.S. Library of Congress, 1987).

Library of Congress: "The balance between religious communities, provided for in the National Pact, was precariously maintained, and undercurrents of hostility were discernible. The Muslim community criticized the regime in which Christians, alleging their numerical superiority, occupied the highest offices in the state and filled a disproportionate number of civil service positions (U.S. Library of Congress, 1987). Chamoun's six-year term came to an end in

[1] The Arabic name of the Constitutional Bloc (CB) is al-Kutla al-Dusturiyya (KD), it is also referred to as al-Dustur, Destour or Destour Party (DP) (Shanahan 2005; 90)

1958, coinciding with civil war of 1958 which was sparked by Chamoun's western support in an era of Arab nationalist uprising in neighboring countries that threatened to spill over into Lebanon. To succeed Chamoun, the Chamber of Deputies elected General Fuad Chebab (also known by Shihab), Mil, to serve as president since at the peak of the violence the army "remained the only body wielding authority throughout the country" (Salibi 1966, 217) and the Chamber needed an authoritative figure to quell the violence. Also he was considered to be non-partisan and thus acceptable to a wide range of political factions (U.S. Library of Congress, 1987). This is a SOLS change.

In 1964 the Chamber of Deputies elected Charles Helou of the Lebanese Social Democratic Party (Kataeb-Phalanges Libanaises, or KPL) to replace Chebab. This is a SOLS change. In 1970 Suleiman Franjieh of the Lebanese Front (LF) was elected president by the Chamber of Deputies. This is a SOLS change. (Cahoon (2010) states that the LF was a "right-wing coalition, mainly Christian, including KPL and NLP, which means that Helou and Franjieh were loosely politically affiliated, but because Helou did not appoint Franjieh, it is considered a SOLS change.) Library of Congress: "Franjiyah was more conservative than his predecessor, Hilu. A Maronite leader from northern Lebanon, he had a regional power base resulting from clan allegiance and a private militia" (U.S. Library of Congress, 1987).

During the period of Franjieh's rule, support for the 1943 National Pact was waning as Muslims, who " by virtue of their becoming a majority as the result of recent demographic changes, demanded an equal share in the political power and distribution of wealth of the country" (Zamir 1980, 59). Franjieh "openly abused his office to further the positions and interests of his own family and supporters" and "added to the rift and precipitated the confrontation between the two communities" (Zamir 1980, 67). During the end of Franjieh's rule in 1975, a civil war began in Lebanon that would last until 1990. "The civil war in Lebanon had many of the characteristics of an economic and social conflict between the rich and the poor... The Christians generally comprised the wealthier sector of the Lebanese society which benefited from the existing political and economic system, while the Moslems comprised the poorer sector, and felt they were being treated as second-class citizens" (Zamir 1980, 62). In 1976 Elias Sarkis was elected president. Though Sarkis is considered to be Non-Party by Cahoon (2010), according to Zamir (1980) "Sarkis served under Shihab as director of the Presidential Bureau" and was considered a "Shihabist" in his political leanings. He had run against Franjieh in the 1970 elections and lost by one vote. Moreover, Sarkis was considered to be "Syria's nominee" (Nisan 2000, 57) for president and was in fact elected by parliament "under pressure from the Syrians" (Hudson 1997, 110). Indeed, Sarkis had considerably more Muslim support than his predecessor. Franjieh was an independent from a smaller political group (Central Bloc), but during the 1970 election had won the support of the Tripartite Alliance, the Shihabists' "main opponent" (Zamir 1980, 50). Thus, since Sarkis' support came from Shihabists and Muslims and Franjieh's came from Menonite Christians and an opposition party, this is a SOLS change.

In 1982, at the time of the Israeli invasion, Amin Gemayel, KPL, was elected president under pressure from Israel. Gemayel was the leader of the Kata'ib, or Phalanges Libanaises (Hudson 1997, 108). This cannot be coded as a SOLS change since GWF coed warlord/foreign occupied from 1977 to 2005. Gemayel's term expired during a period of widespread violence. Christians, backed by Israel, fought Muslims, backed by Syria, in a conflict unsuccessfully

mediated by the United States. Before exiting office in 1988, Gemayel appointed a Maronite, the armed forces Commanding General Michel Aoun, to the post of PM, an appointment rejected by Lebanese Muslims. This is not a SOLS change because he was Gemayel's pre-designated successor. The Ta'if Agreement, signed in 1989, helped to curb the violence. Rene Moawad was elected president shortly after the agreement was ratified. Aoun had refused to accept the Taif Accord ending the civil war. As the DoS writes, he "[launched] what he termed a "War of Liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. In the months that followed, Aoun rejected both the agreement that ultimately ended the civil war and the election of another Christian leader as president" (U.S. Department of State 2010) The DoS also writes that Lebanese parliamentarians then elected Moawad to the presidency (U.S. Department of State 2010). According to O'Balance (1998, 196), Moawad was a Maronite lawyer who had been deputy since 1972. The Falangist Party pledged support to him, as did the Israeli-backed SLA. O'Balance also writes that Aoun considered Moawad's election null and void and it seems like he might have been involved in Moawad's assassination. This is not coded as a SOLS change (to be precise, a SOLSchange30) even if Moawad was definitely not Aoun's predesignated successor. We follow our rules of warlord/foreign occupation.

A few days later, Moawad was assassinated in a car bombing. Elias Hrawi succeeded him and remained in office until 1998. According to O'Balance (1998, 196), the deputies elected Hrawi as president and Hrawi "had unsuccessfully challenged Moawad in the previous election". Hrawi had "good relations with both the Maronite leadership and the Syrians" (197). Based on the fact that Hrawi was a challenger in the election that Moawad won, it seems that he should not be coded as a pre-designated successor. Furthermore, Moawad was backed by an Israeli-backed party, while Hrawi was described as close to the Syrians (Ellis 2002; 34, O'Ballance 1998, 196-7). However, the change from Moawad to Hrawi is not coded a SOLS change based on our rules of warlord/foreign occupation.

In 1998 the commander of the armed forces, Émile Lahoud, non-party, was elected president. Lahoud was a the commander of the armed forces and, with Syrian backing, got special dispensation to be allowed to become president because the constitution actually forbade this (East & Thomas 2003; 300-1). Both Hrawi and Lahoud had the support of the Syrians and according to Geddes this is during the time in which Syria has control over Lebanon. In fact, Lahoud was announced as next president when Hrawi and Syria's Assad met him in Damascus (Blanford 2006, 69). Thus, there shouldn't be a SOLS change here. He had the support of the army and the Syrians. From 2005 through 2008 the country is considered a presidential democracy; however, since Cheibub et al. (2010) do not code a democratic regime type, the sub-regime type has been chosen based on several other sources (Arfi 2005; Salamey 2013; Schalger et al. 2006). In 2007 Lahoud's term expired but Lebanese politicians were unable to agree on who should succeed him. In the meantime, the post remained vacant. Fouad Siniora, the prime minister, served as acting president. This is not a SOLS change. In May 2008, an agreement allowed for the election of the Lebanese army commander, Michel Suleiman, non-party, as president (Nicoll and Johnstone 2008). He was chosen because of his neutrality in the domestic standoff between March 8 supporters (government loyalists) and March 14 supporters (opposition) who disagreed about whether Hezbollah should be disarmed and Lebanese

government troops deployed into the south (Tucker 2010: 1175). We code a SOLS change—Suleiman was not firmly in the government, Lahoud's, camp.

In 2014, Michel Suleiman ended his term without a successor due to the inability of political actors to agree on a successor (Hubbard 2014). Tammam Salam, the prime minister, took over as acting president until a new president could be decided upon (Chehayeb 2016). Because Salam remained as acting president longer than 18 months, he is not considered an interim leader according to the coding rules. Suleiman was a consensus candidate between the March 14 alliance led by the Sunni Future Party and the March 8 bloc dominated by Hezbollah (Chehayeb 2016). Salam faced difficulties in forming a government due to division between the two factions, only succeeding through negotiation and compromise (Bassam & Solomon 2014). Both leaders would not have been in power without the agreement of both the March 14 alliance and the March 8 bloc, thus we consider them as having the same source of support. As a result, the transition from Suleiman to Salam is not coded as a SOLS change.

In 2016, Michel Naim Aoun was elected by parliament as president, ending the two-year political stalemate over the presidency (BBC News 2016). Aoun, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), has a different political affiliation than Salam and was not a consensus candidate, so we code a SOLS change.

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Coded by Anna Carella 7/29/2010
Checked by Michaela Mattes 09/31/2010
Revised by Eelco van der Maat 26/10/2011
Revised by Michaela Mattes 12/17/2011
Updated by Naoko Matsumura 06/13/2012
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Revised by Michaela Mattes 06/11/2013
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