**Colombia**
Vanderbilt

Colombia is considered non-democratic from 1919 until 1930. The Conservatives were in charge of the country during that time. According to US Library of Congress (1988), "[a]lthough Conservatives retained nominal control of political institutions until 1930, they accepted and applied the principle of Liberal representation and participation in government. Conservative presidents appointed Liberals to their bipartisan cabinets and thus included them in political decision making. Although party conflict and rural unrest remained, the coalitions that the two parties formed provided a basis for political stability." Since 1945 Colombia has been considered as democracy according to Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), except in the period from 1948 to 1956 in which Colombia had first a single party regime until 1952 and a military-personalist regime since then until 1956.

While the Colombian government looks fairly democratic with a tradition of civilian government and regular, free election, Colombia has a Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) score of -5 in the time period of 1919-1929, so it is not close to democracy. Our regional expert suggested that oligarchy is probably the best regime category for the period. Therefore, I code this period as an oligarchic regime and code no SOLS changes during this period based on our oligarchy rule. Indeed, every leader of this period was from the Social Conservative Party (PCS).[1]

Marco Fidel Suárez, PCS, served as president from 1918 to 1922. He was forced to resign in 1921 as a result of financial irregularities and increased pressure as result of signing a treaty with the U.S. (Henderson et al. 2000, 161). Congress selected Jorge Marcelo Holguín Mallarino, PCS, as acting president for Suárez (Cahoon 2010; Henderson et al. 2000, 161). This is not a SOLS change. In 1922 Pedro Nel Ignacio Tomás de Villanueva Ospina Vásquez, PCS, became president in elections. This is not a SOLS change. In 1926 Miguel Abadía Méndez, PCS, became president. This is not a SOLS change.

According to US Library of Congress (1988), "[s]ocial tensions increased throughout the Conservative administration of Abadia Méndez (1926-30) and ultimately led to the fall of the PC after its forty-five years in power. The Liberals gained the upper hand in the political arena and retained it during the fifteen years (1930-1945) of global crisis." From 1930 through 1945 Colombia is considered a presidential democracy (see Kline 2012, 354; Osterling 1989, 76). In 1930 Enrique Alfredo Olaya Herrera of the Liberal Party (PL) became president. This is a SOLS change. In 1934 Alfonso López Pumarejo, PL, became president. This is not a SOLS change. In 1938 Eduardo Santos Montejo, PL, became president. This is not a SOLS change.

In May 1942 the reformist Liberal Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo won the presidential elections for his second term for the period 1942-1946 in a climate of fraud. During his administration, he faced a strong opposition from the Conservatives. Indeed in 1944 Lopez survived a coup organized by the Conservative wing. Colombia experienced 4 elections in 1945 (Departmental Assembly, Represents Chamber, Senate, and Municipal Council) in which the

[1] The period between the approval of the constitution of 1886 and the 1930 election of the Liberal party president Enrique Olay Herrera is called the Conservative Republic (See Osterling 1989).

Conservatives gained strong power. In addition, the government was involved in a series of scandals (including the Lopez's family) which eroded his legitimacy. As a result, in July 1945 Lopez resigned in favor of his first presidential designate Alberto Lleras Camargo as an interim president to finish out Lopez term until August 1946 (Lindvall-Larson 2000; Rausch 1999). Therefore, the change from Lopez Pumarejo to Lleras is not a SOLS change because Lleras was an interim leader and remained in office for only 13 months.

In May 1946 there was a presidential election in which the Conservative Ospina Perez (Partido Conservador Social: PCS) won. He promoted a broad coalition, called Unidad Nacional (National Unity) which distributed the Ministries between the two main forces: the Liberals and the Conservatives. Also starting in 1946, the military became a protagonist in the political life of the country because they were employed to repress riots, armed attacks, and guerrilla activity. They had a clear Conservative bias due to a reorganization which purged Liberal officers. In 1948 President Ospina decided to break the Unidad Nacional government and designed a cabinet composed entirely of Conservative members. Moreover, in April 1948 the main Liberal leader, Eliezer Gaitan (the most probably winner in the presidential elections of the next year), was assassinated, triggering the so-called "Bogotazo," a massive urban riot in the country's capital.

As a consequence, a second National Unity government was formed under the Ospina's leadership with the cooperation of some members of the moderate Liberals, such as the new Liberal leader Dario Echandia. It is probably because of these events that starting on 1948 Colombia is not considered a democracy. Once the Bogotazo eased off, 1949 marked the final rift between the Liberals and the Conservatives. The government removed liberal governors and the liberal cabinet members resigned. This dispute became a fight between the Conservative executive and the Liberal Congress. After this rift, the Congress tried to impeach Ospina. He reacted by closing Congress and declaring a state of siege. After all Liberals were removed from positions of power and Congress was closed, a Conservative single-party rule ensured. Geddes (2003) codes a single-party regime in Colombia between 1949 and 1952. We do not code a SOLS change at the beginning of this single-party system in 1949 since Ospina, the Conservative leader and his party, were in power before.

In November 1949 presidential elections were held, and Laureano Gomez, running as the Conservative candidate, won. He did not face competition because Liberals withdrew from the race claiming that the climate of violence in the country was not appropriate to secure clear elections. Under Gómez, censorship intensified, repression against labor increased, and violence against Liberals and Protestants, sometimes with the cooperation of local clergy, intensified. Indeed, Gomez advocated an authoritarian, corporatist system modeled on Franco's Spain. Therefore, the change from Ospina to Gomez is not a SOLS change because both belonged to the same party. Due to an illness Gomez left office in 1951. The Congress, controlled by the Conservatives, elected Roberto Urdaneta to president. Urdaneta took formal possession as acting president, while Gomez retained his position as formal president. We do not code a SOLS change because the single-party regime continues and we do not code Urdaneta as interim.

By 1953 the rift between Gómez and Ospina, two wings in the Conservative party, had deepened, especially because Gomez wanted a re-election and he was determined to impose his own will through the mechanism of an Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. Indeed, Laureano Gómez resumed the presidency from his 'designado' on June 13, 1953. As Gómez moved toward

imposing a new falangist-corporatist constitution, Conservative leaders, particularly former President Ospina, began to conspire with the military against him. So, there was a military coup d'état in June 1953 which was led by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who came to power with the support of both the PL and the 'ospinista' wing of the PC (Primero Colombia). Therefore, the change from Urdanate to Gomez is not a SOLS change, but the coup which deposed Gomez and installed Rojas in office is a SOLS change. Geddes (2003) codes Rojas as creating a personalist-military system. He thus did not rely especially on the Conservative Party. "During his rule, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla attempted to create a popular movement—the Third Force—to support his increasingly personalistic regime and to challenge the dominance of the traditional Colombian parties. His efforts, however, met with resistance not only from the parties but from the military itself. The military as an institution was reluctant to commit itself to a permanent political role that would exclude the parties" (Mauceri 1989, 210).

By 1956 the dictator Rojas appeared to be secure in office because the legislature was suspended, and he ruled by decree. Early in 1957 the armed forces announced their support for Rojas' reelection for the 1958-1962 presidential term, and at the same time The National Constituent Assembly met again in March 1957, and accepted the president's instruction to dissolve itself, leaving him free to decree its replacement without popular election by a new body of 90 delegates of whom he would nominate one-third. The ninety-member body was installed specifically to ratify Rojas Pinilla's re-election until 1962. The response of the parties was a manifesto subscribed to their respective directorates in Bogotá on March 20. It explicitly opposed Rojas' reelection and called for free elections to choose his successor. In April, a Liberal-Conservative coalition announced the opposition candidacy of Guillermo León Valencia. At the end of the month, Rojas ordered the arrest of Valencia. In the face of student demonstrations, a nationwide 'civic strike' that included many banks and businesses, and opposition from the Church and most factions of both major parties, the army forced Rojas out of office and into exile on May 10, 1957. There followed a little more than a year of rule by a five-men military junta led by General Gabriel París, who promised the free election of a civilian president in August 1958. We do not code the change from Rojas to Paris as a minor SOLS change because both belonged to the military. It was 1958 when Alberto Lleras Camargo (PL) became president and the NF government officially started. The transition from a military-personalist hybrid regime to a presidential democracy is coded in 1958. Therefore, it seems incorrect to code a minor SOLS change in 1957.

After 1957, we code Colombia as a democracy. "In July 1957, an alliance between former Conservative President Laureano Gomez (1950-1953) and former Liberal President Alberto Lleras Camargo (1945-1946) led to the creation of the National Front. It established a power-sharing agreement between the two parties and brought an end to 'La Violencia.' The presidency would be determined by regular elections every 4 years and the two parties would have parity in all other elective and appointive offices. This system was phased out in 1978" (U.S. Department of State 2012). Therefore, no SOLS change is coded during this period. Under this system of NF government, the two parties would have parity in all other elective and appointive offices. Since 1957 and even after the National Front, the Liberal and the Conservative party have dominated the political scenario, alternating the presidency between them.

The first elected president was the Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo who was elected with 85 percent of the vote. We code this as a SOLS change (Mil, PL) since his SOLS is the Liberal Party rather than the military. The PL was part of the National Front (NF) along with the PCS. According to Banks et al. (2011, 288), "the two major parties; PL and PCS agreed in power-sharing Pact of Sitges in 1957 and established a National Front under which they would participate equally in government, to the exclusion of other parties." The NF lasted until 1974. Therefore, for the period of 1957 to 1974, the leaders in either PL or PCS headed a government but all these leaders were in the NF. Specifically, from 1959 to 1961 the SOLS is PL. In 1962, the PCS took over until 1966, when the PL regained the leadership. The PCS again returned to the head of government in 1970. The PL took over once again in 1974. The PCS then returned to power from 1983 to 1986. In 1986, the PL took over until 1998 when the PCS regained leadership until 2002.

In 2002, Uribe Velez took office. According to Schlager et al. (2006, 280), although Alvaro Uribe was a longtime Liberal Party (PL) member before is candidacy in 2002 election, he ran presidential election in 2002 as an independent candidate. His SOLS is listed as "unknown" since Cahoon (2010) lists him as non-party. However, according to Cahoon (2010) in 2006 his affiliation changes to PC (Primero Colombia), which is his personalist party. However, we do not code a SOLS change because there should be no SOLS change without a leadership change. PC was a group created to support Uribe, the independent. There is no change in source of support at all. PC (Colombia First) is not a political party that existed before or after Uribe's presidency, nor did it have a platform other than support for Uribe. Originally though he ran as an independent and even had strong Liberal Party support (West 2002). Thus his replacement of Pastrana Arango, a Conservative, is a SOLS change. Economist Intelligence Unit (1998, 10) provides additional information on Uribe Velez' election: "The PL's (Pastrana ́s party) contrasting performance in the Caribbean coastal departments and in Antioquia illustrates the tendency for the more-developed parts of the country to favor the opposition or independents, while the less-developed areas turn out a higher vote for the PL."

According to Hoskin et al. (2003, 17), "It bears repeating that Uribe did not direct his campaign or his message primarily towards the lower classes of society. If anything, it was aimed at middle and upper class citizens who were becoming increasingly anxious about the growing threat of leftist guerrillas. Not surprisingly, this focus is reflected in post-election surveys. A recent study shows that a majority of members of all income groups claim to have voted in favor of Uribe. Nonetheless, support was lowest in the lowest income group (58.8%) and increased steadily by income bracket, with 100% of the highest income group claiming to have voted for him" (as cited in Dugas 2003, 1129-30). Therefore, it appears that Pastrana and Uribe received support from different social classes. Pastrana received the support from the "less-developed areas," while Uribe from "middle and upper class citizens" mostly. In that case, it would be a SOLS change.

In 2010, the Constitutional Court blocked President Uribe's effort to seek re-election to a third term by overturning the constitutional limit of two consecutive terms through a referendum (Reuters 2010). President Uribe abided by the ruling and did not run for re-election. After meeting with Uribe, Juan Manuel Santos resigned as Uribe's defense minister in order to run for president (Colprensa 2012). Uribe supported his campaign and Santos was considered Uribe's

chosen successor (Carlsen 2010). Colombia is coded as a presidential democracy during this period, so we use those coding rules. While the political affiliations of the two men are different, we consider them having the same source of leader support. Uribe's party, Colombia First (CPPC), ended in 2010 and Santos' party, the Social Party of National Unity (PSUN) was established by Santos and other Uribe supporters (Cahoon; Kline et al. 2019). As a result, we do not code a SOLS change between Uribe and Santos in 2010. We recognize that following the election, Santos turned against Uribe and adjusted policy direction, especially with regards to the FARC (Murphy 2014). However, given the coding rules and the information available to voters at the time of the election, we consider the transition between Uribe and Santos not a SOLS change.

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