Burkina Faso
Vanderbilt

Burkina Faso is a non-democracy throughout most of the observation period. Burkina Faso is coded as a pure personalist authoritarian system from independence in 1960 until 1980. During this time period Geddes identifies two distinct personalist regimes. From 1960 until 1966 the country is ruled by Nawalagmba Maurice Yaméogo, of the Union Démocratique du Volta party (UDV). In 1966, there was a military coup supported by the unions led by Aboubakar Sangoulé Lamizana. This is a SOLS change. Later in the year Lamizana changed his affilation to MNR, or the National Movement for Renewal party. This is not a SOLS change. His rule begins a new personalist regime that lasts until 1980. Lamizana initially planned to stay in office for a five- year term; however, in 1971 instead of leaving office as anticipated, the military altered the constitution so that the highest ranking military officer would also be the de facto president of the country (Diabré 1998, 5). As president, Lamizana appointed Gérard Kango Ouédraogo, of the UDV-RDA (Union Démocratique du Voltaic-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain). This is not a SOLS change since Ouedraogo was Lamizana's pre-designated successor, and Geddes codes Lamizana's personalist system as continuing. In 1974 Lamizana dismissed Ouédraogo and ruled with the support of a military junta. This is not a SOLS change. In 1977, under pressure from the unions, Lamizana adopted a democratic constitution. Running as a civilian, he won the 1978 elections to remain president. Burkina Faso is considered a democracy according to our coding rules from 1978 to 1979 (contrary to Cheibub et al. 2010). During this period it is considered a mixed system democracy according to several sources ("Historical cases"; Nijzink et al. 2013). In 1980, the unions went on strike. The government attempted to negotiate, but before they came to an agreement there was a military coup and Saye Zerbo (Mil) overthrew President Lamizana. This is a SOLS change. The SOLS shifts from Lamizana's clique to the military. According to Geddes, from 1980 to 1982 the country is ruled by a military authoritarian regime.

Like his predecessor, Zerbo soon ran into trouble with the unions and was similarly overthrown in a coup "organized by the younger generation in the army" (Diabré 1998, 6) in 1982, led by Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo (Mil). Ouédraogo and his military comrade Thomas Sankara worked together to overthrow Zerbo, but "behind a façade of unity, one could easily distinguish a split into two camps: a conservative one, led by President Ouédraogo; and a more radical wing, led by the prime minister, Captain Thomas Sankara" (Diabré 1998, 6). Ouédraogo had appointed Sankara to the post of prime minister, but later arrested him. Blaise Compaoré of the Sankara camp helped to release Sankara, which led to another coup led by Sankara and Compaoré in 1983, (U.S. Department of State 2010) leading to the arrest of Ouédraogo (Rothchild and Gyimah-Boadi 1989, 222). Sankara represented a clear break with Ouédraogo. We code a SOLS change with Ouredraogo, but not with Sankara. This is based on our notion that Sankara was already strong when Ouregraogo was in power. We consider the reign of Ouedraogo as the end of the military regime (GWF code the military regime until 1982, then code the personalist regime until 1987).

Sankara's government was leftist, Marxist, and revolutionary and as such, was highly unstable (Diabré 1998, 6). Differences among his supporters led to another coup in 1987, during which Sankara was assassinated (Santiso and Loada 2003, 398). He was succeeded by his former

deputy Compaoré, Mil/FP (Front Popular). The fact the Campaore was Sankara's former deputy and helped Sanakara in his coup against Ouédraogo suggest that he might be Sankara's pre-designated successor. However, Sankara and Campaore had a falling-out in 1987 over Sankara's policies. Campaore feared that he might be arrested by Sankara and staged a preemptive coup, killing Sankara (Rake 2001). This suggests that Campaore should not be regarded as Sankara's pre-designated successor and we code a SOLS change here. Geddes codes the Compaoré regime as a new personalist regime. Compaoré initiates a gradual liberalization of the military by legalizing multiparty elections in 1991 (Santiso and Loada 2003, 398). In 1991 Compaoré's SOLS changes from Mil/FP to ODP-MT (Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire-MT). Then in 1996 his SOLS becomes CDP (Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès), a coalition formed by the merger of ten parties (Santiso and Loada 2003, 399). Neither of these are SOLS changes as he is classified as a personalist ruler for this period.

In October 2014, President Compaore resigned as people protested his plans to extend his rule (Smith 2014a). According to the constitution, the head of the National Assembly should have taken over as acting president, but General Traoré, head of the armed forces, dissolved the parliament and initially declared himself in charge of the country (DW 2014b). Protesters were not assuaged, claiming Traoré was too close to Compaore (Flynn 2014). Lieutenant Colonel Zida, an officer in the presidential guard, countered his claim, declaring himself in charge (Smith 2014a; Flynn 2014). Senior military officials agreed to support Zida as leader of the transition period and Traoré conceded, signing a statement issued by military chiefs supporting Zida (Smith 2014b; DW 2014a). The military stated the conflicting claims for power were due to confusion and allegedly Traoré and Zida had been meeting since Zida took power (EFE 2014). The African Union pressured Zida to turn power over to a civilian leader, and in November 2014 Kafando was named interim president (Farge 2014). The millitary coup held power for less than 30 days, so the coup is coded as a 30-day SOLS change. We code the 30-day SOLS change as occurring in the transition from Compaore to Traoré and we do not code a SOLS change between Traoré and Zida. This coding takes the rival claims of Traoré and Zida to be due more to confusion than rival military factions or two separate coups. The transition from Zida to Kafando is not coded as a SOLS change because Kafando was an interim leader.

In 2015, the presidential guard launched a coup against the transitional government fueled by their dissatisfaction with electoral rules in the upcoming elections that blocked members of Compaore's former party from running (Stanglin 2015). General Gilbert Diendéré was named head of the country, though Diendéré is not coded as an effective leader in Archigos so is not included in the dataset. As a result, there is no SOLS change. Popular unrest resulted in a reinstating of the transitional government after the military backed the transitional government and people, forcing presidential guard to step down (Eizenga 2015a).

Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was elected president in the 2015 elections (Eizenga 2015b). In 2015, Burkina Faso became a democracy, so we look at the political affiliation to determine whether a SOLS change occurred. Kafando is considered an interim leader, so his affiliation is not considered in determining whether a SOLS change occurred in 2015. The leader prior to the interim was Lieutenant Colonel Zida, leader of the military coup. Kaboré, a former member of Compaore's party (CDP), had resigned prior to Compaore's resignation, formed new political party (MPP). Because Kaboré was not a military officer and had a political affiliation

not connected to the military, we code a SOLS change. MPP should be considered a splinter party from CDP. The policies of the two parties are very similar, but CDP also had a candidate in the presidential election (Eizenga 2015b).

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