

Thailand

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Between 1919 and 1945, Thailand is coded as a non-democracy. GWF do not have coding before 1945 because their dataset starts with 1945. We code Thailand prior to 1932 as an absolute monarchy (U.S. Department of State). The first ruler in our observation period was King Rama VI of the Chakri Dynasty. He died in 1925 and was succeeded by King Rama VII, Rama VI's brother, also of the Chakri Dynasty (Morby 2002). We code no SOLS change for the leadership change between Rama VI and Rama VII since they belonged to the same dynasty. Following a bloodless coup by civil servants and army leaders in June 1932, Rama VII resigned and the country nominally became a constitutional monarchy. However, the U.S. Department of State describes the period between 1932 until World War II as one "ruled by a series of military governments interspersed with brief periods of democracy." The coup leaders, which included Pridi, Pibul (also: Plaek Pibulsongkram), and Phahon (also: Phraya Phahonphonphayuhasena) held power. They called on Mano (also: Phraya Manopakorn), a retired jurist and member of the Thailand People's Party (Khana Ras Thai – TPP (Con), to become the first PM of the new government (Library of Congress). This is a SOLS change (from a monarchy to a military-personalist hybrid regime).

Soon thereafter Pridi proposed a radical economic reform plan that was unacceptable to the conservative PM and military members in the cabinet (Library of Congress). Pridi had to flee and Mano ruled by decree until he was brought down by another coup. Phahon took power as the second PM (Suwannathat-Pian 2003; Neher 1992). Though the liberal wing of the People's Party, which was represented by Phahon, had gained a small victory versus the conservative and royalist factions, the military and bureaucratic elites subsequently established firm control over Thai politics (U.S. Department of State; Library of Congress). As a result, Phahon retired in 1938 and Pibul took power.

We code Thailand from 1932 to 1943 (from Mano to Pibul) as a military-personalist hybrid regime. We acknowledge that the TPP was characterized by factionalism during this period: the older "Conservatives" led by Mano and the "Promoters" which was divided into three groups — the senior military faction of Phahon; the junior army and navy faction led by Pibul; and the civilian faction led by Pridi (see Wyatt 1984: 247). However, there seem to be evidence to show the strong influence of the military on nearly every issue throughout this period, which finally became consolidated completely under Pibul. Thus, we consider that Mano, Phahon, and Pibul being under the same military-personalist regime and we do not code any SOLS changes under this regime.

Pibul stayed in office until 1944, when he was forced to resign after opinion swung against his Japanese-friendly policy (Fineman 2003; Suwannathat-Pian 2003; worldstatesmen.org). He was replaced by his old rival and fellow coup conspirator, Pridi. Although Pridi and Pibul had been allies initially, they were no longer allies once their common threat from loyalist groups had been removed. Pibul led pro-Japanese policies and he was supported by the military. Pridi led anti-Japanese policies and he formed the partisan resistance army against Japan. GWF code Thailand from 1944 as a personalist regime, which is distinct from the regime began in 1932. Thus, we code a SOLS change with Pridi.

By the middle of 1946, Pridi came under attack by the media and members of the Democratic Party as a result of economic downturn and his handling of the investigation into King Ananda's death and repression of those who criticized his investigation (Chaloemtiarana

2007, 24). There were suspicions that he was responsible for the king's death. Embattled Pridi then resigned in August citing health problems and handed power to Rear Admiral Thamrong who became PM (Chaloemtiarana 2007, 19). Mishra (2010, 118) described Thamrong as one of Pridi's "followers". Ferrara (2015, 128) explains that by 1946, Pridi "was the head of an electoral/parliamentary coalition that included two main groupings that supported Pridi in parliament. The first was the Phak Sahachip (Cooperative Party), regionally based in the northern, northeastern and southern regions that were poor and favored more progressive and populist policies. The second was the Constitutional Front (Naeo Ratthathanmanum), which was based in the Central Region and Lower North, and had the support of mid-level bureaucrats. The Constitutional Front was the more moderate and liberal component of Pridi's coalition. Thamrong was a leader of this wing and can thus be considered pro-Pridi. Geddes et al. also code the Pridi personalist regime as continuing until 1947 and thus include Thamrong as part of the same regime. We code no SOLS change between Pridi and Thamrong.

According to Fineman (1997) and Mezey (1973) the post-Second World War Pridi personalist regime was replaced in a military coup led by Plaek Pibulsongkram – also known as Phibun or Pibul – November 8, 1947. (Note that Archigos version 2.9 codes the transition from Pridi to Pibul on August 21, 1946). Since this transition to Pibul is coded by GWF as being a transfer from a personalist regime to a military-personalist regime and they had different personalist allies, I code it as a major SOLS change.

In the period 1955-1957 Field Marshal Pibul set out to create greater democratic freedoms in an attempt to garner popular support in his political struggle with general Sarit. This was to no avail, however, as Pibul was forced into exile in a coup by Sarit in 1957 (Mezey 1973). After the coup, Pote Sarasin, the secretary general of SEATO, was put in place to head a transitional civilian government and conduct elections (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009, 148; Suwannathat-Pian 2003, 252). General Sarit put together a coalition of parties that would support his regime (Library of Congress 2010). General Sarit did not assume power directly, however; because of personal health issues he let his deputy Thanom head the government in his stead. Upon improvement of his health, however, he assumed direct power over the government on 20 October 1958. (Library of Congress 2010). Because General Sarit and Field Marshal Pibul both had the military as their main source of power, I did not code major SOLS changes for the entry of the Pote Sarasin, Thanom or the Sarit governments. However, since GWF code two separate military/personalist regimes during the period of 1948 to 1973 (one for 1948-1957 and the other for 1958-1973), we code a minor SOLS change and we consider the leadership transition to Pote Sarasin as the beginning of the second military/personalist regime. (While some sources consider him interim, by our rules he is not interim, since he was part of the military/personalist regime GWF code which began right before he took power with Sarit's coup.)

After Sarit's death in 1963, his deputy Thanom assumed power again and would this time rule until 1973 (Library of Congress 2010). One notable fact is that, like Pibul, Thanom experimented with "democratization", but ended his experiment with a self-coup. Following massive student protests and a bloody crackdown by the military, Thanom's position came increasingly under pressure and he was forced to leave the country. On 15 October 1973, King Bhumibol appointed Sanya as an interim prime minister to write a new constitution, after which elections were held in 1975. The elections did not provide a clear mandate and parliament was extremely fragmented. Under these conditions, Seni of the Democrat Party formed a minority government that fell within a month. According to the Library of Congress, "Seni Pramoj, whose Democrat Party was the largest in the right-wing bloc, formed a shaky

government that could depend on only 91 of the 269 votes in the House of Representatives.” It is very hard to identify which parties were in government but the Social Agrarian Party seems to have been part of the coalition (NYT 2/4/1975). Seni was thereafter succeeded by his brother Kukrit from a rival party, the right wing Social Action Party, who led a coalition of no less than 16 parties. Again, we are having trouble identifying the coalition members. Seeing that Sanya’s interim government governed a little more than 17 months, but less than 18 months, the transition to his government was not coded as a SOLS change. Seni’s short rule was coded as a SOLS change 30, whereas Kukrit’s more permanent government was coded as a SOLS change (Library of Congress 2010). This is an ABC scenario.

1976 was yet another tumultuous and transitional year for Thai politics, ending in the return of military dictatorship. The year first saw the dissolution of Kukrit’s coalition, due to increasing pressures from the military in April, following Kukrit’s attempt to press charges of corruption against military officers. (Darling 1977; US Library of Congress 2010) The April elections were won by Seni, who returned to power for another short rule of less than 6 months before he was disposed; the start of Seni’s second period is coded as a SOLS change. (Darling 1977) In October, following increasing tensions between students and (paramilitary) police forces, the military, under the leadership of Admiral Sangad Chaloryu, took over and installed Thanin several days later. However, due to his overt violence in dealing with students, the military removed Thanin from office, leaving Sangad in power for a few weeks before installing General Kriangsak Chomanand in October 1977 (Darling 1977, 1978; Library of Congress 2010).

Sangad’s interim government that took over in the evening of 6 October is the entry of a new period of military rule in Thailand and is therefore coded as a SOLS change, later changes in the leadership of the military regime, such as the entry of General Kriangsak were not coded as a SOLS change. GWF code Thailand as being a military-personalist hybrid state from 1977 to 1988.

The 1988 transition back to civilian rule went seemingly smoothly as Prime Minister Prem resigned and Choonhavan whose party had won a plurality in parliament took over. Choonhavan’s entry was coded as a SOLS change. Like earlier spells of democratization, however, Choonhavan’s rule was interrupted by a military coup by Commander-in-Chief Suchinda Kraprayoon. Soon afterwards the military installed the civilian diplomat Anand Panyarachau as Prime Minister (Neher 1992). This is a SOLS change (from 1991-1992, Geddes considered Thailand as a military regime, meaning that she considers Panyarachau as part of the military regime). Following 1992 elections, but not as a direct result of these elections, Suchinda Kraprayoon took direct power and acquired the position of Prime Minister himself. This is not a SOLS change. However, following massive popular protest, Suchinda was forced to resign and the King reinstated Anand Panyarachau, who pledged to serve for four months to oversee new elections. Anand Panyarachau’s transitional government is consequently not coded as a SOLS change (Neher 1992).

The 1992 elections were won by the parties that had opposed the military regime of Suchinda, but only by a narrow margin. Chuan Leekpai of the Democratic Party (PP) became prime minister on 23 September 1992 and would serve until 1995. His entry into office was coded as a SOLS change. Leekpai led a coalition government of composed of his party, the New Aspiration Party (NAP), Palang Dharma Solidarity parties (PD), the Social Action Party (SAP), and Solidarity (Sol) (Murray 1996; ISAS 1994). On September 14, 1993, Leekpai removed the Social Action Party from his coalition. On September 17, 1993, the small Seritham Party joins

the coalition (ISAS 1994). This exit of SAP and simultaneous entry of Seritham is a single minor SOLS change. Moreover, after New Aspiration left the government in the first week of December in 1994, Chart Pattana (CP) joined the government coalition on 13 December, which was coded as another minor SOLS change (Lee Siew Hua 1994, Hui Yin 1994).

Following the 1995 elections induced by a scandal, Leekpai and his PP were ousted in favor of the Thai Nation Party (Chart Thai -- CT) headed by Banharn Silpa-Archa. Silpa-Archa became prime minister, heading a seven-party coalition in which the major coalition parties were the Chart Thai Party, the New Aspiration Party, the Palang Dharma, the Social Action party (SA), the Nam Thai (NT), the Prachakorn Thai Party (PT), and the Muan Chon (MC). This transition was coded as a SOLS change (Murray 1996; McCargo & Pathmanand 2005; Hewison 1997; Department of State 2011). Note that the Prachakorn Thai Party shortly left the coalition in June 1996, but returned within two weeks (Tunsarawuth 1996). Two months later on August 15, the Palang Dharma left the coalition (minor SOLS change), but the remaining six-party Barharn coalition would retain its majority in parliament (Tunsarawuth 1996). By September however, Barharn Silpa-Archa was forced to resign by his coalition; following elections, Baharn was replaced by Chavalit of the New Aspiration Party (SOLS change). Chavalit headed a similar coalition consisting of the NAP, Chart Pattana, Social Action, Prachakorn Thai, and Muan Chon (King 1997).

New elections as a result of the Asian financial crises returned Leekpai to power on 9 November 1997, which was coded as a SOLS change (Department of State 2011). Chun Leekpai headed an eight-party coalition consisting of his Democrat Party (PP), the Chat Thai (CT), Solidarity, Palang Dharma (PD), Thai, Social Action (SAP), Seritham, and dissidents from the Prachakor Thai Party (PT) (Tang 1997, Department of State 2011, Punyaratabandhu 1998, 1999). On 30 September in 1998, the Chart Pattana Party (CPP) entered the coalition and on July 10 1999, the SAP left the coalition; both are minor SOLS changes (Strait Times 1998, DPA 1999). An April 2000 cabinet reshuffle did not change party composition (the Nation 2000). Leekpai lost the 2001 elections to the wealthy media magnate Thaksin Shinawatra and his new Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in alliance with the NAP. Following the elections, the NAP merged with Thaksin's TRT, which entered into a coalition with the Chat Thai (CT), with Thaksin at the helm (Europa World Yearbook, Mishra 2010). In January 2002 the TRT merged with the NAP – hereafter TRT and on March 5, the CCP entered the coalition (minor SOLS change), leaving again on November 8, 2003 (minor SOLS – the Nation 2002, 2003). In 2005 Thaksin was re-elected with an overwhelming majority, which allowed him to form Thailand's first single party government (minor SOLS change February 6, 2005-Mishra 2010, Phongsutthirak 2005). Thaksin's leadership was controversial, however, and he encountered stern opposition; following mass protests, Thaksin dissolved parliament in February 2006 and called for new elections. However, these elections were boycotted by the opposition and annulled by the courts. No new elections would be held as Thailand saw yet another military coup in September of that year led by Sonthi Boonyaratkalin. Sonthi Boonyaratkalin briefly took over power and then installed Surayud Chulanont as interim prime minister (Department of State 2011). Geddes codes a military regime starting in 2006 so we code a SOLS change when Boonyaratkalin takes over.

According to Geddes, the military regime ended in 2007 and new elections under a new constitution were won by the Pro-Thaksin People's Power Party (PPP). Its leader Samak Sundaravej subsequently formed a coalition comprised of Chart Thai, Pue Paendin (For the Motherland -- PP), Matchimathippatai (Neutral Democratic Party), Ruamjai- thai Chartpattana (Thais United National Development Party), and Pra- charaj (State's Citizens) and became Prime

Minister in January 29 2008 (Department of State 2011, worldstatesmen.org). This is a SOLS change. Both Samak Sundaravej and his direct PPP successor Somchai Wongsawat (no SOLS change) were forced out of office by court rulings, which ultimately led to the dissolution of the PPP. Chaovarat Chanweerakul briefly formed an interim government (worldstatesmen.org). This is not a SOLS change. Upon new elections in December of 2008, the Democratic Party (PP) under the leadership of Abhisit Vejjajiva managed to take over from the PPP's replacement party Pue Thai (PT), because of defections within PT and its coalition (Department of State 2011, worldstatesmen.org, Mishra 2010). Abhisit Vejjajiva formed a coalition consisting of the dissident Newin faction from the TP, the Chart Thai Pattana (CTP; formerly Chart Thai), Bhumjaithai (formerly Matchimathippatai), Pue Pandin, and Ruamjaithai Chartpattana, which is a SOLS change (Prasirtsuk 2009).

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