

Peru

Rice

Peru had been the center of Inca civilization, before the Spanish landed in 1531. Spanish conquerors colonized Peru for about 3 centuries, until Jose de San Martin from Argentina and Simon Bolivar from Venezuela led Peru's independence. Although San Martin proclaimed Peruvian independence from Spain on July 28, 1821, Spain subsequently made attempts to regain its colonies, until in 1879 when it recognized Peru's independence.

Peruvian politics from 1895 to 1919 is referred to as the Aristocratic Republic, in which the government was dominated by elitist upper class. During this period, Peru accomplished not only relative political harmony and rapid economic growth and modernization, but also social and political change (US Library of Congress 1992). Despite some of the successes, the country's poverty-stricken rural people were ignored, and the urban poor laborers were repressed (Encyclopædia Britannica). In 1919, former President Augusto B. Leguia ran as an independent, but the results were unfavorable. Eventually the coup d'état led by General Caceres placed Leguia back into the presidency. Leguia's victory called for the end of the Aristocratic Republic, and marked the beginning of 11 year of dictatorship, called *oncenio* (Rudolph 1992). We code a SOLS change for this leadership change, because Leguia and former president were supported by different groups. In fact, Leguia had been exiled during Pardo's second term.¹

We coded Leguia government as a personalist. Military had a great influence in Peruvian politics throughout his regime, but he personally used military to maintain in power, and thus disintegrated the military hierarchy. The Leguia government did not consider the army as an institution, and obtained support from individual soldiers by bribing them. Leguia promoted officers who were loyal to him, thereby violating the promotion law. Because other officers, either through discipline or prudence, followed those officers who were promoted by Leguia, Leguia could gain support from the entire army. Later he tried to diminish the power of the army by creating Guardia Civil (Civil Guide) to promote counterbalance and military equilibrium (Loveman and Davis 1997).

Leguia consolidated power in his own hands. He ended local elections, and legitimized his seizure of power through a new constitution. He undermined the institution of the state as he ignored and amended the constitution subsequently. He also withered the political parties by periodically amending constitution. When he allowed election, he made the election fraudulent, repressed his opponents, and exiled many of them such as Haya del Torre, who funded Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). Leguia created a new set of political appointees dependent on him and filled the legislature with his own cronies, thus making it a rubber stamp (Klaren 1986, 635).

Evaluation on Leguia government is mixed. Leguia supported export-led growth by

¹ Note that Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) codes Peru as -88 in 1919.

encouraging foreign investment and expanding public works programs. This brought some economic prosperity until the great depression (Rudolph 1992). While Leguia's government accomplished some success economically, it was not very successful in international relations. Peru and its neighbors had engaged in intermittent territorial disputes since independence (U.S. Department of State 2010). During his term, Leguia signed Salomon-Loranzo treaty that fixed the modern boundary with Colombia and two other treaties. The treaty was very unpopular among Peruvians. The economic downturn due to the great depression, as well as the unpopular Salomon-Lozano treaty discredited Leguia government, and he was overthrown by a military revolt led by Colonel Luis M. Sanchez Cerro in 1930. This brought a 35-year period of military interference in politics (Rudolph 1992). We code a SOLS change for this leadership change, because two presidents had different supporting groups; Leguia was personalist while Sanchez was a military leader. Before Sanchez Cerro took the office, Manuel María Ponce Brousset assumed 2-day interim presidency until Sanchez Cerro arrived to Lima (Cahoon 2012). We do not code a SOLS change for the leadership change from Leguia to Brousset, because Brousset was an interim president.

The period from 1930 to 1938 is referred to as "tripartite" political system, with the military often ruling to suppress the "unruly" masses represented by APRA and the PCP, which were socialist organizations that sought reforms to benefit the working class (US Library of Congress 1992).

Sanchez Cerro was a Lieutenant Colonel when he took power in a military coup. Loveman (1999, 90) writes "As leader of the junta, Sanchez Cerro purged and reassigned officers or doubtful loyalty, placing confidants in key positions." Yet, military uprisings caused him to resign, and the Navy installed Ricardo Leoncio Elías Arias as the next president (Rudolph 1992). Two other military leaders followed: Gustavo A. Jiménez was head of a provisional junta, and David Samanez Ocampo y Sobrino was the chairman of the national junta. This period is coded as a military regime, since Sanchez Cerro's attempts to tamper with hierarchy were unsuccessful. Thus Leguia to Sanchez Cerro is a SOLS change, but the other transitions during the military government are not.

In October 1931, the military junta permitted a national election, and Sanchez Cerro of the Revolutionary Union (UR), which is the party he founded, gained a victory against APRA (Encyclopædia Britannica). We code his regime as personalist. While Sanchez Cerro was originally a military officer, his rank was relatively low and he had worked towards marginalizing the military during his first time in office and was removed by the military as a result. By the time of his "election" his main support was the a coalition of the upper class and peasant coalition against APRA, which represented mostly working and middle class interests.

During his term, Sanchez faced harsh opposition from APRA, including the uprising in Trujillo. He was eventually assassinated in 1933 by apristas (Encyclopædia Britannica). When Sanchez died, the congress elected Benavides to complete Sanchez Cerro's 5 year term (US Library of Congress 1992). Benavides, a respected general who was largely uninvolved

in Peruvian politics during Sanchez time in office, had been appointed by Cerro Sanchez to the commander of all Peruvian forces in 1933 to give himself and the war effort against Colombia some more legitimacy. After Sanchez was assassinated, congress chose Benavides to fulfill Sanchez' term. Benavides set out to avoid war, which antagonized the supporters of Sanchez Cerro in congress. In November 1933, Benavides then disbanded the cabinet he had taken over from Sanchez-Cerro, suggesting that he was moving even further away from his predecessor (Masterson 1991, 52-55). A high-ranking military officer, Benavides ruled with support by the military, which built up during his presidency with weapons purchases, training, and spending. He also did not interfere much with the military hierarchy. The military was quite fractionalized at the time and Benavides seem to have ensured that his rule was propped up by another pillar of support-- moderate reformist and center-right civilians, including the more moderate parts of the upper class. We thus code his regime as a military-personalist regime and, since he was not a pre-designated successor of Sanchez Cerro, we code a SOLS change.

In the 1939 election, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche of the Conservative Coalition (CC), a Lima banker from a prominent family and son of a former president, won the presidency (US Library of Congress 1992). Prado was close to Benavides. For example, Masterson (1991, 67) notes that "After Benavides became president in 1933, Manuel Prado remained politically loyal and was named to the cabinet in April, 1939. Benavides then used his substantial influence to advance the formation of Concentracion Nacional (National Concentration), a coalition of centrist and conservative groups, to back Prado's candidacy. Additionally during May the chief executive announced plans to conduct a plebiscite in order to lengthen the presidential term from four to six years and the congressional tenure from five to six." Prado could be seen as a continuation of Benavides personalist regime, without the military pillar of support. However, he was elected in a limited suffrage election, which is characteristic of an oligarchic system, and is often viewed as a representative of the wealthy elite. He also accepted APRA support for the presidential election, and in return legalized the party when he won (TIME Magazine 1959). Furthermore, "From 1939 to 1945, the elected president, Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, wielded these executive powers moderately. He by and large respected the rules of the game. He also gradually incorporated the APRA party into politics (though he did not formally legalize it until just before his term ended). (Levitt 2012, 11)" He also accepted democratic elections at the end of his regime. Therefore, there are few indicators of a personalist rule and his regime is probably most accurately viewed as oligarchic and his assumption of office is a SOLS change.

The Allied victory in World War II reinforced the relative democratic tendency in Peru, as Manuel Prado y Ugarteche's term came to an end on July 28, 1945. Jos Luis Bustamante y Rivero, who ran for president as a candidate for the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN), was overwhelmingly elected as a president and took office on July 28, 1945. This is coded as a SOLS change because the two parties were on opposing ends of the political spectrum. On 29 October 1948, following economic problems and unrest, Bustamante was overthrown in a military coup. This is another SOLS change.

As a result of the coup on October 29, 1948, General Jose Manuel Arturo Odría Amoretti (Mil) became the new president. According to Geddes (2003), Odría imposed a personalist-military dictatorship on the country. On June 1, 1950, Odría handed over chairmanship of the military junta to his deputy, Zenón Noriega Aguero. However, this is not coded as a SOLS change because Geddes (2003) codes the personalist-military regime as continuing. Aguero was a ‘designated successor’ and also a high-ranking military official. Furthermore, Aguero took power so that Odría could run for president as a representative of the PRP (Partido Restaurador del Perú), the only party in the elections. Odría regained office on 28 July 1950 (Masterson 2009, 151).

The next SOLS change came with the democratic elections held in 1956, in which Odría was not a candidate. Manuel Prado y Ugarteche returned to office with the support of the leftist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). His party was the Pradista Democratic Movement/Peruvian Democratic Movement (MDP). Prado took office on July 18, 1956. In 1962, when the lack of a clear majority winner in the democratic presidential elections led to a deal to put Odría back in the presidency, there was a military coup led by Ricardo Pérez Godoy on July 18, 1962 (Masterson 2009, 159). This is a SOLS change. Geddes (2003) codes a military regime for the year 1962.

A reform-minded junta firstly headed by General Ricardo Perez Godoy held power for a year (from June 18, 1962 to March 3, 1963), and then the junta was led by Nicolas Lindley Lopez from March 3, 1963 to July 28, 1963. This is not a SOLS change. The junta appointed a commission to draft a new election code with the goal of preventing an aprista (APRA) candidate as a winner in the 1963 military-supervised elections. As a result of the elections, Fernando Belaúnde Terry won the presidency as a candidate of his own party, Acción Popular (AP – Werlich 1978, 279-80). This is a SOLS change since the Belaunde is not beholden to the military but his party. We also code a presidential democracy under Belaunde. With public discontent growing under Belaunde’s leadership, the armed forces, this time led by General Juan Francisco Velasco Alvarado (Mil), overthrew the Belaunde government on October 3, 1968 and established a period of military rule that lasted until 1980. This is again a SOLS change.

On August 30, 1975, President Alvarado stepped down because of health reasons and General Francisco Morales Bermudez, another leader of the coup, became the president on August 30, 1975. This is not a SOLS change, because both leaders have the military as their source of support. Morales Bermudez in 1977 called for elections to form a new Constitutional Assembly in June 1978. This assembly called for presidential elections in 1980, which were won in May 1980 by former President Belaunde of the AP. This is a SOLS change. The country then experienced approximately ten years of democracy.

Amid inflation, economic hardship, and terrorism, Alan Garcia Perez, the leader of the APRA, won the presidential election in 1985. The transfer of the presidency from Belaunde to Garcia on July 28, 1985, was Peru's first transfer of power from one democratically elected leader to another in 40 years. It was also a SOLS change. However,

Garcia administration's was plagued by hyperinflation from 1988 to 1990 and voters chose Alberto Fujimori as president in 1990. Fujimori was supported by a new right-wing political party: Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría (New Majority/Change 90: NM-C'90). The entry of the Fujimori government is a SOLS change. For this brief period of Fujimori's leadership (1990-1991) we code Peru as a presidential democracy. This is in contrast to Cheibub et al. (2010) who do not code these years as democratic. Furthermore, while it seems that the 1979 Constitution (which was in place at the time), suggests a mixed system, since it refers to the government's responsibility to the congress, Cheibub et al. (2010) code previous governments under this constitution as pure-presidential (for more perspectives on coding these years see also Schalger 2006; Moestrup 2007). As such, we code a presidential system in line with Cheibub et al. (2010). On April 5 1992, democratically elected Fujimori dissolved the Congress in an "auto-coup," revamped the constitution, and intervened in the Supreme Court. Large segments of the judiciary, the military and the media were co-opted by Fujimori. Geddes (2003) codes a personalist regime starting in 1992. However, this is not a SOLS change since a) according to our coding rules, we code no SOLS change during the leaders' tenure and b) we want to keep changes in institutions and changes in interests separate.

Media support for Fujimori was achieved through an elaborate network of corruption, run by the National Intelligence Service, engaging in bribery, blackmail, trumped-up legal charges and hostile corporate takeovers. Fujimori's constitutionally questionable decision to seek a third term, and subsequent tainted electoral victory in June 2000, brought political and economic turmoil. On September 16, the President Alberto Fujimori called for new general elections to be held as soon as possible. Two months later, Fujimori flew to Tokyo and sent his resignation via fax. After that, the opposition forces in the Congress named the President of the Congress Valentin Paniagua as interim president and new elections were scheduled for April 2000. This is not a SOLS change. These elections were won by Alejandro Toledo of Perú Posible (Possible Peru - PP), which he had founded in 1994. This is a SOLS change. The Toledo government consolidated Peru's return to democracy. New elections on July 28, 2006 resulted in García Pérez of the left-wing populist APRA winning the presidency. This is another SOLS change.

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Pre-1945 coded by Jee Yun Oh on March 20, 2011
 Post-1945 no information on the initial coder (test case)

Pre-1945 revised by Ashley Leeds on June 13, 2013
 Pre-1945 revised by Naoko Matsumura on August 15, 2013

Post-1945 edited by Eelco van der Maat on February 23, 2012

Post-1945 revised by Michaela Mattes on February 24, 2012

Combined by Ahra Wu (Rice) on September 7, 2013

Edited by Andrew Wood (Rice) on May 24, 2014

Edited by Michaela Mattes on 09/30/2014