

Honduras

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In 1919, Honduras was governed by President Francisco Bertrand Barahona, a member of the Honduran National Party (PNH). Bertrand had been President since 1915, and was constitutionally elected at that time (indicating that his regime was, in fact, democratic). However, in April 1919, he “made it clear [that] he planned to impose his brother-in-law....as his successor” (Meyer and Meyer 1994, 71). This may indicate a shift towards more of a personalist government, but his declaration resulted in the Civil War of 1919, which, in turn led to both Bertrand and his brother-in-law fleeing the country on 9 September, at which point Bertrand handed over power to a council of ministers. We code no specific autocratic regime type for Bertrand, because the vice president was considered too ill to take office, power passed to the next individual in the order of succession—Francisco Bográn Barahona, who became the next acting president and oversaw presidential elections. This is not a SOLS change, even though Bográn was a member of the Honduran Liberal Party, PLH.

On February 1, 1920, the winner of the presidential elections of 1919, General Rafael López Gutiérrez, a member of the PLH, took office. This is a SOLS change. Lopez had in fact been one of the leaders of the 1919 Civil War, and his administration was noted for corruption and civil unrest. There were 33 rebellions during his time in office. However, Honduras is listed as a democracy from 1920-1923, so despite the corruption, democratic government still continued. The system was a presidential democracy, dominated by two political parties, the PLH and the PNH. Following presidential elections in 1923, where no candidate won a majority, Lopez declared Honduras to be in a “state of siege” on December 12. He then declared himself Dictator on January 31, 1924. This suspension of the regular electoral process, coupled with the institution of martial law by Lopez, led to the beginning of the Civil War of 1924. Lopez was killed during the course of the war, on March 10, 1924. Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) codes Honduras -66 during this period, and we do not specify a sub-regime type. Vicente Tosta Carrasco, a member of the PLH served as “provisional” president, and oversaw presidential elections, in which the United States intervened and banned the participation of any politicians who had taken part in the Civil War (Meyer and Meyer 1994, 502). This is not a SOLS change.

Note that our spreadsheet says Carrasco, and Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009) says Vicente Tosta. They are the same person. The winner of these elections was Miguel Paz Barahona, a member of the PNH, which is a SOLS change. Paz’s government, though controlled behind the scenes by Carías Andino, who was banned from participating in the elections, appears to be democratic and not authoritarian (Meyer and Meyer 1994, 502). This is also corroborated by the spreadsheet’s polity data.

In 1929, presidential elections led to Vicente Mejía Colindres becoming president as a member of the PLH.¹ This is a SOLS change. Again, Honduras continues to be listed as a democracy. In 1933, Carías Andino won the presidential elections as the PNH candidate. Geddes (2003) classifies his regime as being a single-party/personalist hybrid dating from this year until 1956. However, the spreadsheet does not indicate a departure from democracy until 1936, at which point Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) codes Honduras as a non-democracy. This is due to the fact that it was only with the Constitution of 1936 that Carías Andino extended his term in the presidency and abolished the independence of local governments, and deemed Honduras to be in a state of siege (a condition that could be extended indefinitely by Carías Andino) (Meyer and Meyer 1994, 186). These new additions allowed for Carías Andino to solidify and extend his hold and control of power in the Honduran government. Carías Andino stayed in power until 1949. We code SOLS change when Carías Andino came to power. According to presidential democracy rules, we would not code a SOLS change in 1933. However, we follow Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013) and code a SOLS change as the single party-personalist regime began. He came to power democratically, but he later established an authoritarian regime while it was a smaller proportion of the time of his rule.

In 1948, after calls for free elections, Andino agreed to refrain from being a candidate in elections held in October of that year. However, his choice for the PNH candidate, the minister of war, Juan Manuel Gálvez, won the elections, thereby continuing the single-party/personalist state. As Gálvez can be seen as Andino's pre-designated successor, we do not code a SOLS change. Gálvez entered office on January 1, 1949. In 1954, while being treated abroad for a health condition, Gálvez was deposed by his Vice President, Julio Lozano Díaz, also of the PNH. Díaz cited the deadlock over the 1954 presidential elections as the reason for his assumption of power. Although Díaz was clearly not a pre-designated successor, as a high-ranking member of the PNH, this transition is not coded as a SOLS change. Díaz also proclaimed himself "Supreme Head of State," whereas the previous leaders had adopted the title of "president".

Díaz continued to take actions to eliminate opposition and consolidate his power, leading to much popular disapproval (Armed Conflict Events Data 2000b). In October 1956, Díaz was deposed in a military coup led by young military reformists. This group established a military transitional government. Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009) lists Héctor Caraccioli Moncada as being the leader of the government, but there were actually three men in charge; the others were Roque Rodríguez Herrera and Roberto Gálvez Barnes. This military government began planning for elections, which were held in 1957. This military takeover is not coded by Geddes (2003). Since the military leaders did plan elections right away, and they were in power only 14 months, this is coded as an interim government, and their entry into power is not a SOLS change.² In

¹ Note that WSM lists Vicente Mejía Colindres as a member of the PHN. However, we were able to find many sources that describe him as a leader of Liberal Party (PLH) (see Bethell 1990, 287; Striffler and Moberg 2003, 245). Thus, we code his SOLS as PLH.

² Note, however, that some argue that this coup represented an important new independent role for the military as arbiter in Honduran politics (Armed Conflict Events Data 2000a).

1957, democratic elections were held for the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly then selected José Ramon Villeda Morales, the leader of the PLH to become president. This is a SOLS change. Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) does not, however, code Honduras as a democracy at this time.

In 1963, shortly before congressional elections, Villeda was deposed in a military coup led by General Enrique López Arellano, which is a SOLS change. López Arellano, who governed in a single party/military hybrid government (his party affiliation was the PNH), was in power until 1971. We code Arellano's SOLS as Mil/PNH. According to Banks et al. (2011, 603), PNH was "created in 1923 as an expression of national unity after a particularly chaotic period the PNH is a right-wing party with close ties to the military." Geddes (2003) codes Honduras as having a single-party/military hybrid regime between 1964 and 1971. Until 1963, Honduras is coded as a democracy.

For the period between June 1971 and December 1972, control of the government was briefly turned over to the civilian Ernesto Cruz Uclés, a member of the PNH. Honduras is coded as a single-party/ military system 1963-71 and it is coded as a pure-military regime 1972-1981. No sub-regime type is coded 1971-1972, but it is not a democracy.

It appears that Lopez Arellano was behind a deal to allow a civilian president from his party to take over while Lopez Arellano retained power over the military himself (Columbia Encyclopedia n.d.; Gale Encyclopedia of Biography n.d.). Between February and December 1970, Business and labor organizations, which had been severely damaged under Lopez's rule, requested Lopez to agree the Political Plan for National Unity (PPNU). This plan was a kind of a political pact between two major political parties: Liberal party and National party, stipulating that a single candidate for president to be selected by both parties, then the new chief executive would choose a cabinet based on expertise. On January 7, Lopez Arellano, giving his support as head of the armed forces, formally announced the PPNU. Following the March elections in 1971, Jorge Bueso Arias and Ramon Ernesto Cruz were chosen respectively as the Liberal and National party presidential candidates. As a result of election, a National party victory placed Ramon Cruz in office and gave the Nationalist control of Congress. However, Cruz had no true control over the government as Lopez Arellano exerted his power over Cruz through Ricardo Zuniga who was a National party politician and Secretary of President Lopez Arellano. Ricardo Zuniga had a decisive control in Cruz's government as a minister of government and justice. Ricardo Zuniga worked in collaboration with President Lopez Arellano to form a civil-military government though 1963 to 1971. Morris (1984, 43) describes that "Ricardo Zuniga became minister of government and justice, assuming a critical role in filling government oppositions and placing the Nationalist politician at a central point for the disbursement of public funds....it was soon evident that national unity under the Pacto had become National party domination, with the minister of government functioning as a de facto chief of state. President Cruz was unable or unwilling to act decisively amid heavy criticism of his "do-noting"

government....Overly manipulated by his minister of government, President Cruz was being politically bypassed.”

Therefore, although Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009) codes Cruz as the effective leader, and Geddes (2003) codes Lopez Arellano’s single party/military regime as ending in 1971, we do not code a SOLS change because Cruz is considered an interim leader.

On December 4, 1972, General López Arellano staged another, purely military, coup and gained control of the government for a second time. We code a minor SOLS change here. López Arellano remained in power until 1975, when he was forced to resign due to corruption scandals (U.S. Department of State 2010). The military government continued however, first with General Juan Alberto Melgar Castro, who was in power from 1975 until 1978. In 1978, he was replaced with General Policarpo Juan Paz García. In 1980, a democratic transition began in Honduras, fuelled by a similar movement in Nicaragua and instability in El Salvador (U.S. Department of State 2010). On July 25, 1980, García became the “provisional president,” and general elections were held in 1981. Geddes (2003) stops coding Honduras as a military government in 1981. In 1982, following the approval of a new constitution, Roberto Suazo Cordoba, the leader of the PLH, was elected president. This is a SOLS change.

In 1986, following presidential elections in which the PLH was again victorious, Jose Azcona del Hoyo assumed the presidency, which is another SOLS change. “The [1986] campaign appeared to pit two PLH candidates—Mej fa and San Pedro Sula engineer Jos Azcona Hoyo--against the PNH's Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero in a contest that saw the two PLH candidates criticize each other as much as, or more than, they did their opposition outside of their own party. The final vote count, announced on December 23, produced the result that the makeshift electoral regulations had made all but inevitable; a president who garnered less than a majority of the total popular vote. The declared winner, Azcona, boasted less than 30 percent of the vote, as opposed to Callejas's 44 percent. But because the combined total of PLH candidates equaled 54 percent, Azcona claimed the presidential sash. Callejas lodged a protest, but it was short-lived and probably represented less than a sincere effort to challenge the agreement brokered by the military” (International Business Publications 2013, 74-5).

Because these years are coded as autocracy, and because Azcona was not the pre-designated successor of Suazo, this change is a SOLS change, even though they both belonged to the same party, but different factions. According to Banks et al. (2011, 604), one of the central factions inside the PHL: *Rodista* was split into a radical antimilitarist conservative and a presidential faction encompassing right-wing technocrats with close links to the business community and the armed forces. Hoya was supported by radical antimilitarist conservatives. In the early 1980s, there were two formal factions: the conservative Rodista Liberal Movement (MLR) and the center-left Popular Liberal Alliance (Alipo)... By 1985, the MLR split into three factions: one led by President Suazo Cordova, which supported Oscar Mej fa Arellano as a 1985 presidential candidate; a second faction headed by Efra Bu Gir, who also became a presidential

candidate; and a third faction led by Jos Azcona Hoyo, who ultimately was elected president with the support of Alipo, which did not run a candidate. “The Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH) has had to contend with the forces of international division since its inception in 1890. Factionalism has been a fact of Liberal politics, and the party has tended to be less discipline than its rival. With exiled leadership, and separated from public resources or patronage, the morale and organization of the Liberal party has suffered” (Morris 1984, 75).

In 1990, the PNH’s candidate, Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero, won the presidential elections and assumed office (SOLS change). Economic troubles and accusations of corruption led to a victory for the PLH in the presidential elections of 1994, when their candidate, Carlos Roberto Reina Idiáquez was elected with 56 percent of the vote (U.S. Department of State 2010). This is a SOLS change. The PLH was also successful in the 1998 elections, and their candidate for that year, Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé assumed office, which is not a SOLS change. In 2001, the PNH candidate, Ricardo Rodolfo Maduro Joest won the elections of that year and assumed office in 2002, which is a SOLS change. In 2005, Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, the leader of PLH, won the presidential elections and assumed office in 2006. This is another SOLS change. He remained in office until he was overthrown in 2009, following attempted constitutional reform, a date outside the range for this study.

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