

## Guatemala

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Guatemala is considered authoritarian from 1919 to 1944 (until December 19, 1944). Manuel José Estrada Cabrera of the Liberal Party (Lib) ruled as president from 1898 to 1920. According to Dosal (1993, 37) Estrada Cabrera “built a brutal dictatorship by purging the army, eliminating political rivals, and terrorizing the entire population” and he “alone made and executed public policy.” Clayton and Coniff ([1999] 2005, 52) also write that “Estrada used his relations with military colleagues to preserve himself and his friends in power and fend off rivals.” Accordingly, we code his presidency as a personalist regime. Guatemala can be considered a democracy between 1944 and 1949. From 1949 until 1996 it can be considered a non-democracy. According to Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013), during this time, there were periods of well-defined autocratic regimes in office (personalist 1954-1957, military 1963-1985, indirect military 1967-1970). Other autocratic years did not have as clearly defined institutions in place. After 1996 Guatemala is coded as a presidential democracy.

In 1920 Estrada Cabrera was ousted in a coup. Carlos Rafael Herrera y Luna took over as “provisional” president (Dosal 1993, 96). Cahoon (2012) suggests he was initially “acting,” but then became a regular president and his plan to establish a tripartite union including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (Henderson et al. 2000, 150) suggests that he was not provisional in a traditional sense. There is also some confusion as to his SOLS. Cahoon (2012) lists his party the Conservative Party; however Dosal (1993, 96) claims he was a Liberal. A newspaper article from the New York Times (1921) claims that he was elected by the Unionists, and Fauriol and Loser (1991, ix) list him as a Unionist. Indeed, Dosal (1993, 96) explains that the Unionists, who were responsible for Estrada Cabrera’s overthrow, allied with “dissident Liberals” in choosing the new government, which was bipartisan.

Since two sources confirm that Herrera y Luna was a member of Liberal Party (See Dosal 1993, 52; Opie 2009, 70), we code Lib for his SOLS. We also consider this a SOLS change. However, it is true that he was supported by the Unionist Party, which was a coalition of Liberal and Conservative (Wilson 1992, 386). Indeed, his government included both Liberal and Conservative (Unionists) members, and reconstructed a political and economic system more sympathetic to the interest of the oligarchies. Regarding the sub-regime type for his time in office, Dosal (1993, 97) describes Herrera y Luna’s government as “an oligarchy dependent on foreign capital” (i.e. the United Fruit Company owned by U.S. businessmen). Except for Dosal (1993), very little has been written about Herrera y Luna’s time in office, perhaps due to the short duration of his presidency. Given his short rule with so little information about his regime, we code no specific consolidated regime type for him.

In 1921 Herrera was overthrown in a coup led by General José María Orellana Pinto. This is a SOLS change. Dosal (1993, 103) explains that Orellana was shortly thereafter elected

with “the military controlling the electoral machinery and silencing the opposition.” Dosal (1993, 54) states that “The military terminated the oligarchy’s brief tenure as a governing class on December 17, 1921. Support within the army was so complete that not even Herrera’s personal guard resisted....Although the new cabinet included representatives of the oligarchy, the military high command, having assumed its role as arbiter of presidential succession, circumscribed the range of civilian political activity....military reserved the presidency, and the ministry of war for itself, thereby blocking any future civilian effort to reduce either the size of the bureaucracy or the army.” This description justifies coding a military regime for Orellana.

In 1926 Orellana died of heart attack and General Lázaro Chacón González became president. This is not a SOLS change. Chacón’s time in office is also considered as a military regime. First, he was an active General and served as vice president under Orellana (Lentz 1999, 214). Second, he used repressive measures. Lentz (1999, 214) states that “he suspended the constitution in 1928 in response to civil unrest against government.” Way (2012, 24) mentions that shortly after the election, “he led an administration that curried favor with the working class through quasi-populist discourse while oppressing and imprisoning radicals.” Bulmer-Thomas (1987, 44) writes “When [Orellana] dies in office in December 1926, no disturbances followed and he was succeeded by the first designate General Lázaro Chacón, who was later ‘elected.’”

In 1930 Chacón suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and was forced to resign (TIME Magazine 1930). Baudilio Palma, second designate under the Constitution, became “acting” president (Bulmer-Thomas 1987, 61; Fauriol and Loser 1991, ix; TIME Magazine 1930). This is not a SOLS change. General Manuel Orellana, Mil, then ousted Palma in a military coup and became “acting” president (Fauriol and Loser 1991, ix; TIME Magazine 1930). This is not a SOLS change, either. The United States refused to recognize his government so he resigned on December 29 (Dosal 1993, 176). According to Dosal (1993, 177) “José María Reina Andrade became provisional president on December 31, and the United States recognized the government a week later.” This is not a SOLS change.

Andrade called for new elections, which were “won” by Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, Lib, in February 1931 and he became president. Ubico was a caudillo, a military strongman, and led a repressive regime (Gilderhus 2000, 145). This is a SOLS change. According to Dosal (1993, 177), Ubico, like Napoleon, “was the state.” Ubico hand-picked members of the legislature and “replaced public officials – appointed and elected— with those personally loyal to him” (Yashar 1997, 43). Provinces were directly controlled by him and generally centralized power in his person and used significant coercion (Yashar 1997, 44-5). Accordingly, we code his rule as personalist, from 1931 until 1944.

After a massive strike against his rule, Ubico resigned. General Juan Federico Ponce Vaidez (listed as Lib and “acting” by Cahoon (2012)) took power as leader of the Revolutionary Government Junta. According to Fauriol and Loser (1991, 29) “a new military junta assumed

power when Ubico resigned. The junta's coordinator, General Federico Ponce Vaides, in effect sustained the political framework that had operated under Ubico." Ponce Vaides assumed the title of provisional president, while he tried to hold on to power (Handy 1986, 23). Smith and Adams (2011, 80) also describe him as a Ubico's handpicked successor. Thus, this is not a SOLS change.

Once it became clear that Ponce Vaides planned to be just as oppressive as Ubico, a group of junior officers supported by students and the public staged a revolt. "The October 1944 revolt generated a provisional government around a triumvirate leadership: Francisco Javier Arana, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, and Jorge Toriello Garrido, a prominent civilian" (Fauriol and Loser 1991, 29). Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, Mil, is the leader listed by Archigos during this time. Since the military junta was provisional in nature and guided the country towards elections, this is not a SOLS change. Starting in 1944 the country is considered a presidential democracy. POLITY gives score of 6 from December 20, 1944 to December 10, 1950.

In 1945, Juan José Arévalo won the first free presidential election in the country, and he took office in March 1945. This is a SOLS change. He remained office until 1951. He was unable to stand for reelection, so, there were two possible government candidates: the Defense Minister Arbenz and the Chief of the Armed Forces Arana. After Arana's assassination, the path for Arbenz was clear to run for presidency. The election of 1950 was not entirely clean and fair and thus the country is not anymore coded as democratic that year. In this election Arbenz, won in a landslide (65% of estimated registered voters) because the main antagonists were eliminated and his military enemies exposed. Ebel (1998, 29-30) describes that "Arbenz won 79 percent of the illiterates' votes which were cast publicly and in some cases probably cast twice, but only 51.5 percent of the secret ballots." In the capital city, which was much more closely monitored, he received only 43 percent of the 58,000 votes cast (Lindvall-Larson 2000). Jacobo Arbenz takes over under the same coalition as Arévalo's coalition, and thus this is not a SOLS change.

In 1954, the USA was disturbed about Communist influences in the Arbenz government, especially because he ordered a shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia. So, for the USA it was a proof of the connections between the Guatemalan government and the Soviet bloc. As a result, the CIA organized a counterrevolutionary invasion in June 1954.

On June 25 Arbenz received an ultimatum from his senior officers to resign. These officers looked for an agreement with the invasion force lead by Castillo Armas. Arbenz resigned on June 27 and left office in charge of his friend the Chief of the Armed Forces Carlos Enrique Diaz de Leon. Cahoon (2012) also called Diaz de Leon a provisional leader. However, Diaz de Leon was doomed because the USA did not approve a friend of Arbenz in office. Therefore, Diaz resigned as member of the Junta and a new military Junta was established with Monzon as chief. Monzon met with Castillo to arrange a pact to share the power and create an anticommunist pro-USA regime. Castillo did not accept to share the power and the battle started

again. The U.S. ambassador mediated between the two sides and achieved that Monzon stayed in office as a provisional president until the Junta elected a new president by vote (Blasier 1989, 176). On July 15, Carlos Castillo Armas assumed office.

Therefore, the change from Arbenz to Díaz does not constitute a SOLS change because Díaz was interim. We do not code the change from Díaz to Monzón as a SOLS change either, because Monzón governed as provisional president. After Monzon, Castillo Armas takes power and installs a personalist regime according to Geddes (2003). Armas had a different SOLS than Monzon's last regular predecessor, Arbenz and we therefore code a SOLS change when Armas comes to power.

In July 1957 Castillo Armas was assassinated, and his Vice President Luis Arturo González López assumed office as acting president. According to Lentz (1994, 343), Gonzalez Lopez was a lawyer and named to the Supreme Court in 1945. González López was appointed as an interim leader, whose primary goal was to call elections. Cahoon (2012) lists him as a member of PAN. He called for presidential elections on October 1957. There were three main candidates: Miguel Ortiz, General Manuel Ydigoras, and Miguel Asturias. The results indicated that Miguel Ortiz won elections, but Ydigoras did not accept the results claiming fraud. Ydigoras launched a series of demonstrations, and as a consequence the Congress declared null the elections and imposed martial law. This situation yielded to a coup which deposed President Gonzalez Lopez, and a military junta assumed the power formed by Colonel Oscar Mendoza Azurdia as leader. This transition is not coded as a SOLS change because the military still had the idea of temporary control in mind, as evidenced by their appointment of Colonel Guillermo Flores Avendaño as the new interim leader and the call for elections. Lopez Azurdia stayed in power for two days and then yielded to the second designated in the line of presidential succession, Colonel Guillermo Flores Avendano as a way for returning to constitutional rule, calling for elections on January 1958. In conclusion, the change from Castillo to Gonzalez Lopez, then to Mendoza Azurdia, and then to Flores Avendano are not coded as SOLS changes because we consider Gonzales Lopez, Mendoza Azurdia, and Flores Avendano all to be interim leaders.

In the elections in January neither of the candidates won the majority of the votes. Therefore, the Congress would elect the winner among the two most voted candidates. As a consequence of the difficulty of the Congress to elect the winner, the two candidates signed a pact in which they agreed to form an anticommunist regime lead by Ydigoras of the Partido Democrático Nacional de Reconciliation/del Restate (National Democratic Reconciliation/Redemption Party- PRDN). However, once in office, Ydigoras did not strictly enforce the anticommunist laws. We consider that this change from Flores Avendano to Ydigoras is a SOLS change because it means the end of a military regime. Ydigoras was neither military nor a pre-designated successor of Avendano's. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013) code the country under Ydigoras as a personalist regime.

Ydigoras was overthrown by the member of the military, Alfredo Peralta Azurdia, in March 1963. Peralta assumed power initially and started a new stage of militarization of Guatemala's political and economic life. From this point the military would rule either directly or indirectly as an institution until 1995 when the indirect military regime is coded as ending by GWF. During the entire time period between 1963 and 1995 none of the leadership changes are major SOLS changes because the regime is classified as military regime (1964-1966, 1971-1985) or indirect military regime (1967-1970, 1986-1995) by GWF. This means that all these leaders relied on the military in order to attain office and remain in power. Civilian presidents had little power; according to Schlager et al. (2006, 521) "the 1965 Guatemalan constitution called for presidential elections at four-year intervals. A civilian, Mendez Montenegro of the moderate leftist Revolution Party (RP), was elected to the presidency in 1966. We code a minor SOLS change with Mendez Montenegro because GWF code a shift from a military regime to an indirect military regime here. Although it is true that real power remained in the hands of the armed forces, Mendez Montenegro himself was a civilian and PR was a not military-puppet party.

Following new presidential elections, Mendez Montenegro is succeeded by Arana Osorio of the National Liberation Movement (MLN) in 1970. However, military control characterized Guatemalan politics through the early 1980s (see Schirmer 1998, 17-8). Therefore, we code the SOLS of Arana Osorio as Mil to emphasize the aspect of effective control in a government. We code a minor SOLS change with Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio. This is because GWF code a shift from an indirect military regime to a military rime here.

In 1974, Laugerud Garcia, the candidate of a coalition of the MLN and the Institutional Democratic Party (PID) comes to power (Rouquié 1987, 356). Still, the real power lies with the military, so we continue to code Mil as the SOLS of the president. In 1978 General Fernando Romeo Lucas García (Mil) won with the support of the PID and the PR (Rouquié 1987, 356). The military retained real power.

In 1985, Geddes (2003) codes the end of the direct military rule because a new constitution is promulgated which reasserted a degree of political autonomy to local governments by means of provisions for the direct election of municipal officeholders, and also because in November presidential elections was celebrated. Starting in 1986 until 1994, Geddes (2003) codes Guatemala as indirect military because the military still retained important powers over government policies. According to our coding rules, we code SOLS changes as occurring when the new leader is neither an interim leader not a pre-designated successor. There is no SOLS change in 1985 since the same military leader, Mejia Victores, from before is continuing in office.

In the 1985 election, there were two main parties competing for presidency: the so-called "army party" UCN and the Christian Democratic Party (DGC). Cerezo Arevalo belonged to the

DGC and he won the elections. Therefore, this change constitutes a minor SOLS change because Geddes (2003) codes it as a transition from military regime to indirect military regime in 1986. He stayed in power until 1991 when Jorge Antonio Serrano Elías was elected president. He ran for the MAS party which belonged to Ríos Montt, who was impeded to compete because the constitution did not allow an individual who became chief of state as a result of a coup d'état to run for presidency. The MAS party was associated with the oligarchy and the conservative sector of the military. In consequence, this party was the opposition of Cerezo's DGC. So, the change from Cerezo to Serrano is a minor SOLS change based on our indirect regime rule. In 1993 Serrano Elías attempted an auto coup, as Fujimori did in Perú. However, after public protests Serrano Elías resigned and left the country. In June 1993, following a two day government of Espina Salguero (MAS), his VP (not a SOLS change), the ex Procurador de Derechos Humanos (like an Ombudsman) Ramiro de León Carpio (non-party) was elected as "interim" president (BBC 1993, Washington Post 1993). He was in office until 1996. Thus, this last change is a minor SOLS change because even though de León Carpio is considered as "interim" president, he stayed in office more than 18 months. He was not Serrano Elías' pre-designated. Following our ruling on indirect military regime, we code a minor SOLS change with de León.

Starting in 1996, Guatemala can be considered a presidential democracy and SOLS changes are coded accordingly. After León de Carpio, the next four presidents were constitutionally elected for different parties each. So, each change constitutes a SOLS change.

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